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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fact that married male workers earn more than single male co-workers is well 
established in labor economics literature. Studies indicate that a marriage earnings 
premium exists in a range from 10 to 40 percent. However, the source of this differential 
is still controversial.  
Some studies explain that the wage premium exists because married male workers 
are able to specialize in labor market activities, while their wives (spouses) specialize in 
household activities. A related explanation, which is based on the lower cost of human 
capital acquisition for married men, is that married men make a greater investment in 
human capital. They anticipate that they will be able to recoup the benefits of such 
investment for a longer period of time since they think they will have to work a larger 
fraction of their lifetime than single male workers due to family responsibilities.  
On the other hand, some studies attribute the marriage wage differential to factors 
other than human capital investments. One argument is that more productive workers are 
selected into marriage. Alternatively, employers may prefer married workers over single 
workers due to a perception that married workers are more responsible or stable. Another 
explanation is that marriage indicates certain unobservable individual characteristics, 
such as ability, honesty, loyalty, dependability, and determination, which are valued in 
both the labor and marriage markets. The explanation of the marriage wage premium is 
an important subject in labor economics because it can contribute to achieving a better 
understanding of the determination of individual wages and worker productivity.  
The purpose of this research is to explore and identify any difference in the 
performance and productivity of U.S. Marine Corps officers that may be attributed to 
marital status or family structure. The analysis will include an evaluation of fitness 
reports, promotion to O-4 and O-5 ranks, and retention to 10 years of commissioning 
service (YCS). The primary goal is to obtain an unbiased estimate of marital and 
dependency status on male Marine Corps productivity by controlling for selectivity 
associated with the characteristics of officers who marry versus those who are single.  
2 
The scope of this research consists of six parts: (1) a review of previous studies; 
(2) an analysis of the basic characteristics of the dataset; (3) the development of 
appropriate hypotheses to address various explanations and types of marriage premium; 
(4) The estimating of models and the testing of hypotheses; (5) a summary major 
findings; (6) and a discussion of recommendations and limitations of the study and 
possible extensions. 
The primary research question of this thesis is whether either marital status or 
family size has an impact on the productivity, promotion and retention of male Marine 
Corps officers. The source of any such potential premium is explored by secondary 
questions as to whether the source of a marriage premium is attributed to (1) the 
accumulated years of marriage or (2) selection into marriage. By analyzing accumulated 
years of marriage, we test whether the marriage premium can be explained by household 
specialization and human capital theories. By analyzing selection into marriage, we 
examine whether the premium is uniquely related to marriage or is caused by better 
performing officers’ marriage decisions. Finally, the research analyzes whether the 
estimations in the study are affected by selection bias due to retention decisions of 
Marine Corps officers. 
This thesis consists of the following discussions. Chapter I introduces the 
problem, purpose, and scope of the thesis and presents the research questions and 
organization of the thesis. Chapter II presents findings about the existence of a marriage 
premium and summarizes major hypotheses about the source of the marriage premium by 
reviewing existing studies. Chapter III describes the personnel system of U.S. Marine 
Corps officers (officer promotion, up-or-out policy, and promotion tournament system), 
officers’ family life, the basic characteristics of the data, and construction of the 
variables. This chapter provides preliminary analysis of the data by focusing on the 
marital-status-related variables. Chapter V explains the hypotheses tested in the study and 
presents model specifications and hypothesized effects of the variables. Finally, Chapter 
VI summarizes the major findings of the study, recognizes limitations of the thesis, and 
provides recommendations for further research.  
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Analyzing the determinants of wages, as a proxy for productivity, is a popular 
subject in labor economics. Of all the examined determinants, marital status has been 
found to be one of the most robust ones. Kol and Ryu (2002), in their survey of the 
literature, indicate that estimates of the marital wage premium in previous studies range 
from 10 to 40 percent.  
Since it is difficult to find direct data on job productivity per employee, most 
studies use proxies that are more readily available. Based on an assumption that the labor 
market is competitive, profit-maximizing employers optimize their incentives for 
production by compensating employees based on their marginal productivity (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 2003), which supports the rationale to use earnings as a proxy for on-the-job 
productivity.  
On the other hand, some studies use performance ratings and job grades to 
measure of on-the-job productivity. Korenmark and Neumark (1991) utilize such proxies 
for the first time to analyze the marriage premium for employees of a single firm. They 
assume that, within a given grade level, those with high performance ratings or high 
rankings were more productive than those with low performance ratings or rankings. 
They rationalize their assumption by pointing out that a job’s grade reflects its relative 
value to the company, and positions of similar value are placed at the same classification 
level. A justification is established for performance ratings, which are given by 
supervisors who are instructed to rate employees on current performance and 
contributions based on the requirements of their present assignments. The following 
section describes the techniques and measures used in the literature.  
B. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE MARRIAGE PREMIUM 
The source of the marriage premium is a controversial issue among labor 
economists. Many analyses test the various explanations and much evidence has been 
presented for each hypothesis. Keeping in mind that there is no dominant explanation 
4 
among these tested hypotheses, such explanations help economists construct a framework 
for better understanding the effect of marriage on the job productivity of workers.  
Explanations of the marriage premium can be categorized according to whether or 
not the premium is associated with higher productivity caused by marriage. There are two 
explanations that indicate that marriage directly increases productivity. One is that 
marriage causes household specialization in which the husband specializes in market 
activities. The second explanation is that marriage causes faster human capital acquisition 
by the husband during marriage. There are also three arguments why marriage is not the 
cause of the premium. These explanations are based on selectivity into marriage, 
employer discrimination, and marital matching.   
1. Marriage Increases Productivity  
Gary Becker (1981) was the first to claim that married men are more productive 
than single men in labor economics. He states that there is a direct relationship between 
the time spent in a particular economic activity and the incentive to invest in human 
capital specific to that activity. He also asserts that within a household there is a division 
of labor based on the initial differences in comparative advantage between men and 
women in the labor market and in the home. To minimize opportunity costs, husbands 
specialize in labor market work and wives in nonmarket work. Therefore, such 
specialization will generate an advantage for married men in the form of a productivity 
difference between them and nonmarried men. 
In her well-cited study, Hill (1979) claims that marriage makes men more 
productive. Controlling for many qualifications, she suggests that the probable reason for 
the unobserved 25% to 50% marriage premium is not unobservable individual 
characteristics, but rather, the increased productivity due to marriage.  
Later, Korenman and Neumark (1991) deduce that marriage is a dynamic 
productivity-enhancing event in a man’s life. They find not only that selectivity into 
marriage can explain only 20% of the premium, but also that the number of years of 
marriage is also important in understanding the source of the premium, a finding that 
opposes selection bias explanations.   
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Chun and Lee (2001) also find that marriage makes men more productive. Testing 
Becker’s theory versus the selection hypothesis, they find no evidence to support the 
selection hypothesis; gains from marriage are positively associated with the degree of 
specialization within the household. 
In one of the most recent and most innovative studies on the subject, Antonovics 
and Town (2004) use data on monozygotic twins to examine the selection hypothesis. 
Assuming that such data allow them to control for unobservable heterogeneity, the 
authors estimate a 26-percent marriage premium. They point out that this result is “robust 
to alternative specifications of the wage equation and various attempts to control for 
measurement error.” Their conclusion is that marital status has a causal effect on men’s 
wages.   
Regarding the military labor market, Kol and Ryu (2002) also find that marriage 
increases both retention and productivity of male officers in a fertile dataset of U.S. Navy 
officers who entered the Navy between 1976 and 1985. Because of the varying job 
characteristics in the Navy, they divide their sample into two subsamples: Unrestricted 
Line Officers (URL) and Staff and Restricted Line officers (STF/RL). Their regression 
results indicate that the married men in both sub samples achieved higher performance 
ratings, higher promotion, longer service retention, and more graduate education than 
single officers. However, results are smaller for STF/RL than for URL officers. Although 
they attribute some portion to selectivity into marriage, their fixed-effects results indicate 
that the positive effect of the marriage premium is still robust.  
a. Marriage Makes Men More Productive Because of Household 
Specialization 
One argument that explains how marriage makes men more productive is 
Becker’s (1973) household specialization model. His theory is based on two assumptions: 
(1) that each person tries to do as well as possible, and (2) that the “marriage market” is 
in equilibrium. According to Becker, a household will attempt to maximize its total 
output and therefore will tend to make a division of labor within the household for both 
market and non market labor activities. He explains this willingness as: 
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…even a multi-person household has a single well-ordered preference 
function. For, if one member of a household – the “head” – cares enough 
about all other members to transfer resources to them, this household 
would act as if it maximizes the “head’s” preference function, even if the 
preferences of other members are quite different. (Becker, 1974, p 17) 
Consequently, all else equal, the division of labor will result in more 
human capital investment and more job experience in favor of married men as compared 
to single men whose status limits the possibility for a division of labor. Thus, the 
specialization model suggests that married men are more productive and will therefore be 
paid more than single men. 
Korenman and Neumark (1991) also agree with the specialization theory. 
They hypothesize that, if Becker’s formulation is correct, the marriage premium will also 
have a dynamic structure. In other words, since a greater duration in marriage would 
cause more specialization in labor market activities, the effect of marriage on on-the-job 
productivity (and wages) will increase with additional years of marriage. Their cross-
sectional findings show that each additional year of marriage increases wages 2.3 percent 
in the early years of marriage and roughly 1-2 percent at the mean of years married.  
Specialization theory strongly suggests that the time wives devote to 
producing household commodities is important for determining married men’s 
specialization in labor activities. One available proxy used in studies to determine wives’ 
time devoted to household activities is their market work hours. However, this proxy may 
have a varying effect on husbands’ time spent on housework. Hersch and Stratton (2000) 
suggest that married men with employed wives may spend more time on housework than 
men whose wives are not employed. They emphasize that there are two components that 
affect the time married men spend in housework activities. One is the increase in 
household income, which decreases their time in household work, and the other is the 
increased value of their wives’ time, which increases the men’s their time in housework. 
The net effect of the proxy will depend on the magnitude of these two components.  
Based on this reasoning, examining wives’ work hours will provide a 
better understanding of the specialization hypothesis. Gray (1997) shows that men whose 
wives worked in the labor market full-time earned five percent less than men whose 
7 
wives work in home production. Chun and Lee also find that the earnings of married men 
decreased by about 0.1 percent for each additional hour worked by their wives in the 
labor market, a result that supports Becker’s theory. On the other hand, Loh (1996) and 
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) present contradictory findings in their studies. Holding 
marriage length and other variables constant, Loh shows that married men with wives 
who devoted more time to the labor market received a higher marriage premium than 
those whose wives did not work at all. Similarly, taking into account that there may be an 
inherent endogeneity problem between a husband’s wage and his wife’s work hours, 
Jacobsen and Rayack state that the premium that was initially obtained from cross-
sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates in favor of single-earner husbands is 
eradicated or significantly dampened by adjusting for simultaneity.  
As an alternative to the marital lifestyle, cohabitation is also examined by 
econometricians to understand the nature of the marriage premium, since cohabitation is 
based on a more gender-balanced household division of labor (Cohen, 2002 citing from 
South and Spitz, 1994). Providing less financial responsibility, the cohabiting lifestyle is 
an increasing trend in the United States. Cohen (2002) recognizes that there is a relation 
between the growing population of cohabitors and the decline in the marriage premium 
from 1976 to 1999. He shows that controlling for cohabitation reduces the rate of decline 
by 35 percent for white and black men.  
Stratton (2002) also examines the nature of the marital and the 
cohabitation wage premiums for men by estimating wage models that permit both 
differential wage growth and selection effects. She utilizes data from the National Survey 
of Families and Households (NSFH). In this survey respondents were interviewed first in 
1987-1988 and again in 1992-1994. She restricts her analyses to white, non-Hispanic men 
under 65. She obtained 3,281 observations for the first survey and 2,515 for the second, 
on which she conducts both cross-sectional and panel analyses. 
Stratton concludes that “both the marital and cohabiting wage differentials 
are statistically significant with currently married men earning about 22 percent more and 
currently cohabiting men earning about 13 percent more than the base group of men who 
have never married and cohabited. Neither past marriage nor past cohabitation appears to 
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significantly influence wages” (p.206). According to the cross-sectional results, 
differences in education, experience, and other explanatory variables explain about two-
thirds of the raw marital-wage differential of 56 percent. Further, Stratton divides 
cohabiting men into two separate groups: those cohabiting for more than 3 years and 
those cohabiting less than 3 years. She finds that only men in long-term cohabiting 
relationships experienced a wage gain that was similar to that of married men. She 
concludes that “men do not receive a wage benefit from all joint household operations, 
but instead that marriage has a nearly unique effect on men’s productivity.”  However, 
she does not attempt to explain the source of this “unique” premium.  
Cohen provides another reason for the decline in marriage premium: the 
increasing trend in wives’ contribution to the labor market. Cohen states that, from 1976 
to 1999, the amount of wives’ annual hours contributed to the labor market increased by 
39 percent, while husbands’ contributed annual hours increased only 8 percent. If the 
household specialization theory is true, the more married women spend their time in labor 
market activities, the more their husbands do house work. And the more time married 
men spend in housework activities, the less time and energy they will have to specialize 
in labor market activities, which will lower the marriage premium. Therefore, the relation 
between the increasing trend in wives’ annual hours in the labor market and the 
downward trend in husbands’ marriage premiums is evidence for the household 
specialization theory.  
Kol and Ryu (2002) also find evidence for the household specialization 
theory in their study. According to their findings the more years URL male officers had 
been married, the better their performance ratings and the higher their promotion rates. 
However, STF/RL male officers received better performance ratings when they had fewer 
years of marriage. According to Kol and Ryu, “since staff officers spend more time at 
home than line officers, many of whom are deployed overseas, staff officers devote more 
time to household production”  (p.94).     
b. Marriage Makes Men More Productive Because They Invest More in 
Human Capital 
Another argument to explain why marriage increases the productivity of 
men is that married men invest more in human capital, which results in higher 
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productivity and higher wages. Two explanations are suggested in order to explain faster 
human capital acquisition. First, family responsibilities make married men more future-
oriented. Anticipating that they will spend more time in labor market activities, married 
men are willing to invest more in human capital than single men. Hence, they expect to 
harvest the benefits of their investment for longer periods. The second explanation is that 
married men can finance their investment in human capital from their spouses’ earnings 
at borrowing rates below those available outside the family.  
Kenny (1983) attributes wage growth rates to the additional investment in 
human capital that takes place during marriage. He interprets the intercept in his 
statistical estimates as the average additional human capital investment during years 
married. However, he doesn’t present any direct evidence to support his claim. Hill 
(1979) shows that, on average, married men spent more time than single men in training 
on their current job. Loh (1996) points out that Lynch (1992) statistically confirmsthat 
married people are more likely to receive company or on-the-job training. On the other 
hand, Cornwell and Rupert (1997) cast doubt on the idea that married men have faster 
human capital acquisition because Bergstorm and Schoeni (1992) reported earlier that 
men and women with more formal education tended to marry later than those with less 
education. 
Kol and Ryu (2002) also examine the human capital theory of the 
marriage premium. They use graduate education attainment as an indicator of human 
capital investment because, “since firm-specific training and tenure are the same for all 
Naval officers, graduate education is the only human capital investment that officers can 
make” (p.95). Their regression results indicate that married officers make higher 
investments in human capital.  
2. Marriage Does Not Increase Productivity 
Although the wages of married men are higher than those of single men, that 
premium may not be caused by marriage. Testing two explanations of how marriage 
makes men more productive, Loh (1996) and Cornwell and Rupert (1997) find evidence 
against these arguments. Loh demonstrates that there is no male marriage premium 
between single-earner and dual-earner marriages. However, according to the 
specialization theory there should be an additional marriage premium for husbands in 
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single-earner families. He also finds that time spent with the wife before marriage has no 
effect on the marriage premium. This finding contradicts the specialization model.  
Using the same dataset for a longer period, Cornwell and Rupert (1997) contradict 
Korenman and Neumark’s (1991) findings. Cornwell and Rupert suggest that marriage is 
not productivity enhancing, but a pure intercept shift in productivity that is no greater 
than five to seven percent. This finding contradicts the specialization theory because 
more specialization in market activities should lead to faster wage growth with longer 
marital duration.  
a. Marriage Premium is Caused by Selectivity Into Marriage 
The selectivity hypothesis is that marriage does not make men more 
productive. Instead, men who are, or who will be, more productive get married. In 
general, people marry when they believe that the perceived value of marriage is greater 
than that of staying single. Therefore, people who perceive potentially good prospects 
within marriage will be more likely to marry. Consequently, these prospects will turn into 
economic differences that will be observed as marriage premia for married men. Ginther 
and Zavodny (1998) propose another, yet similar, selectivity story by emphasizing that 
since women may be reluctant to marry low earners, men’s earnings may affect (be 
endogenous with) their own marital status.  
According to Narkosteen and Zimmer (1987), there is a joint endogeneity 
problem that results from a potential correlation between the factors that influence both 
marital status and earnings. However, they also emphasize that these factors may be 
unobserved by the researcher, which will eventually cause missing variable bias in the 
estimates of the marriage premium. In order to control for this possible endogeneity, they 
use instrumental variables estimation on cross-sectional data. They find that the 
magnitude of the marriage premium is unchanged, but it becomes statistically 
insignificant. They interprete this finding as evidence that the marriage premium is due to 
selection. 
Korenman and Neumark (1991) point out that selectivity explains only 20 
percent of the estimated impact of the marriage premium in their findings. However, they 
also emphasize that the remaining impact may contain a more complex selection process 
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not corrected by fixed effects. For example, men with more rapid wage growth (rather 
than men with a higher wage level) may be more likely to marry. 
Cornwell and Rupert (1997) claim that the marriage premium results from 
unobservable individual effects. Their results show that single men who will marry in the 
future earn at least as much as those who are already married. They attribute this result to 
the explanation that married men have characteristics valued in both the marriage and the 
labor market, such as ability, honesty, loyalty, dependability, and determination.   
Ginther and Zavodny (1998) examine the selection hypothesis using a 
“natural experiment” that may make marital status uncorrelated with earnings ability for 
some men. They estimate the effect of “shotgun” (forced) weddings on earnings of 
married men. They assume that the likelihood of premarital conception is a substitute for 
the likelihood that the couple marries at random. This assumption helps them eliminate 
unobservable, potentially more “qualified,” characteristics of men who will marry. They 
first find an apparent marriage premium in the cross-sectional analysis. However, it 
disappears in the fixed-effects results. They also show that, in both fixed-effects and 
cross-sectional regressions, married men with a premarital conception receive a lower 
marriage premium.  They interpret these findings that the marriage premium for married 
men without premarital conception is caused by their higher wage-earning characteristics, 
in other words, the marriage premium is due to selection bias.  
Kol and Ryu (2002) analyze selection into marriage by comparing single 
officers who will marry in the future and the single officers who will remain single in the 
future. They find a consistent marriage premium between these two groups for both 
STF/RL and URL male officers. However, by using fixed-effects methods in order to 
correct for unobservable individual characteristics, they are still able to obtain 






Kol and Ryu claim that “at least some portion of the higher performance of married 
officers that are attributed to marriage is due to potentially more successful officers 
choosing to marry” (p.96).  
Antonovics and Town (AT) (2004) attempt to identify the casual effect of 
marital status on earnings by using data on monozygotic (MZ) twins, which helps them 
control for unobservable heterogeneity. They use data from the Socioeconomic Survey of 
Twins. Although they had data on 487 male twin pairs, only 280 pairs were MZ pairs. 
They selected individuals who worked 26 weeks per year, who worked at least 20 hours 
or at most 100 hours per week, and who earned above $4.25/hour (the Federal minimum 
wage in 1994) or below $60/hour. After dropping 116 twin pairs due to missing values 
and an additional 28 twin pairs due to their sample-selection criteria, AT ended up with 
only 136 pairs eligible for the sample. In their analyses, besides marital status, they also 
include schooling, tenure at the current job, region, and age of the twins.  
In their cross-sectional results, AT report that married men earned a 19-
percent higher wage than unmarried men, all else equal. However, when they estimate 
this difference within the twins only, the coefficient becomes larger and reveals a 26-
percent wage difference in favor of married men.  Additionally, they report that the 
estimated wage premium was above 21 percent when the wage was at a first full-time job 
or was the wife’s full-time work experience, or when the number of children was 
included in the models. They claim that their findings do not support the selection 
hypothesis and they conclude that marriage causes men’s wages to rise.  
Antonovics and Town’s study is valuable as an innovative approach, one 
that rules out the selection hypothesis. However, AT are not able to reject the employer 
favoritism hypothesis with their findings. In addition, although they claim that their 
sample has similar characteristics with the 1995 March supplement of the Current 
Population Survey, there are only 31 pairs who differ in their marital status within the 





b. Marriage Premium is Caused by Employer Favoritism 
One last argument about the source of the marriage premium is that this 
premium results from employers’ preferences for married workers over single ones. 
According to this hypothesis, employers perceive that married men have more 
responsibilities and that those responsibilities cause them to be more stable and to work 
harder. These perceptions may be much stronger when supervisors are older and more 
likely to be married themselves. 
Another aspect of the employer favoritism argument, suggested by Pfeffer 
and Ross (1982), is that married men are rewarded because they conform to social 
expectations that men should be married and support their families. Single men and 
married working women are penalized because they do not conform to this norm. They 
also hypothesize another explanation for employer preference, which is also stated by 
Loh (1996). According to this second hypothesis, the presence of wives allows married 
men to build better social relations and networks with their superiors that eventually pay 
off in better job ratings, faster promotions, and faster wage growth. 
Emphasizing that employers’ wage decisions are in part based on 
paternalistic attitudes that make them feel that workers who have greater financial 
responsibilities deserve higher wages, Hill (1979) suggests that the wage differential of 
married men may be a result of employer discrimination. She also points out that 
employers may not be responsible for the discrimination. Employees who are under 
pressure of greater financial responsibilities may be more adamant in demanding higher 
wages for themselves.  
Testing the earnings differential among self-employed workers, Loh 
(1996) examines whether employer favoritism explains the marriage premium. According 
to his formulation, if the marriage premium is not due to supervisor discrimination, then a 
positive marriage premium should be observable in both self-employed and salaried 
workers. His results show that self-employed married men earn less than self-employed 
single men. He claims that this result supports the argument that the marriage premium is 
due to employer favoritism. Loh also refers back to Korenman and Neumark (1991) and 
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points out that the faster-wage-growth finding of Korenman and Neumark is also 
consistent with employer favoritism toward married workers.  
c. Marriage Premium is Due to Marital Matching 
Jacobsen and Rayack (JR) (1996) find that self-employed workers, a 
group that is not subject to the discriminatory behavior of supervisors, earn less when 
their wives work in the labor market than when their wives do not. Although this finding 
is consistent with the household specialization theory, their sophisticated statistical 
models result in a new explanation for the marriage premium (and the marriage penalty): 
marital matching. This theory suggests that the apparent marriage premium is caused by a 
particular form of attachment in which men with positive labor characteristics marry 
women who have less attachment to the labor market. 
They use three different estimation techniques, in all of which the natural 
log of hourly wage is the dependent variable and the wife’s paid work hours is the 
variable of interest. In their models, they also control for demographic factors, 
occupation, experience, and education. Ordinary Least Square estimates show a 
substantial premium for men with a non-working wife. However, when they use the 
number of children in the household, the age of the youngest child, the age of the wife, 
and dummies for the wife’s educational attainment as instruments in the two-stage 
instrumental variables models, the premiums “disappear or actually reverse to a wage 
penalty for having a non-working wife among nonprofessional, non-managerial workers” 
(p.271). Although instrumental variable model results may reflect that there are 
complementarities in market production between husbands and wives or the ability of the 
husband to search more carefully for a good job match if the wife is providing income for 
the household through market work, JR strongly point out that the importance of these 
results is the disappearance of the negative impact of wives’ work found in earlier studies 
for managers and professionals. Finally, the use of the fixed-effects technique to control 
for marital matching causes the premium for single-earner husbands to be dampened or to 
disappear completely. In light of these results, they claim that there is little evidence of 
employer favoritism or productivity difference explanations for the marriage premium 




…the results suggest that there is a particular form of marital matching in 
which men with positive labor-market characteristics pair with women 
who have less attachment to labor market. These results demonstrate that 
marital matching is an additional explanation for the apparent single-
earner wage premium in the OLS estimates. (p.272)  
Although JR do not mention the drawbacks of using data on self-
employed workers, Loh (1996) presents three problems in such data: (1) self-employed 
workers are more likely than wage workers to understate their earnings to lower their tax 
liability; (2) their reported income may represent returns to physical capital; and (3) their 
business losses and gains incurred may be reported as part of their labor market earnings.   
C. STUDY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL 
1. Anderson and Krieg (2000) 
Anderson and Krieg (AK) (2000) analyze the marriage premium for U.S. first-
term enlisted male Marines. Their study is the first to analyze marriage in the military. 
They obtained data on 65,535 Marines provided by U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Manpower Plans and Policy Division. After 
eliminating women, missing observations, and Marines that re-enlisted, 44,103 
observations remain in their sample.  
Anderson and Krieg state that Marines of higher ranks (E-3 (Lance Corporal) and 
E-4 (Corporal) are evaluated and promoted according to their proficiency and conduct 
scores as well as the time spent in their current rank and their time in service. Although 
Marines of lesser ranks (E-1 (Private) and E-2 (Private First Class) are also assigned 
proficiency and conduct scores, their promotion is mostly based on time-in-service. 
Proficiency scores measure technical skills, specialized knowledge, leadership, initiative, 
and dependability, while conduct scores measure military bearing, attitude, obedience, 
and integrity. One would assume that Marines with higher proficiency and conduct scores 
would be more likely to be promoted. The descriptive statistics in the research indicate 
that single Marines have lower Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores and 
lower physical fitness test (PFT) scores, have served in the military longer, are on 
average older, and are generally evaluated better in proficiency and conduct terms. 
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Using probit models to calculate the effect of marriage on the probability of 
promotion to the next grade, AK find a 4.7-percent higher probability to promote from E-
3 to E-4 for married male Marines than their single counterparts. They also find that 
married Marines without dependents have a higher promotion probability than married 
Marines without dependents, which is contrary to the supervisor favoritism theory. The 
perception of supervisors about married personnel should not change, whether these 
personnel have dependents or not. AK also estimate a greater probability of being 
promoted for divorced Marines than single Marines. But divorced personnel in the 
Marine Corps are different from divorced civilian workers since they receive a great 
amount of support from counseling services and they live on military bases where they do 
not do housework. Therefore, AK do not represent this finding as a contradiction of the 
household specialization theory. 
AK also implement heteroskedasticity-corrected OLS models in order to estimate 
the effect of marriage on proficiency and conduct evaluation scores. They find that 
marriage positively influences both scores. According to the results married Marines 
receive 0.04 points higher proficiency scores and 0.035 points higher conduct scores than 
single Marines. In order to protect their readers from falling into the perception that these 
scores are too small, AK emphasize that even a one-tenth of a point increase in 
proficiency scores increases a Marine’s probability of being promoted from E-3 to E-4 by 
1.38 percent. This difference is even larger when the fact that the promotion probability is 
compounded across multiple promotions is considered. Similar to the probit model 
estimates, married Marines with dependents again tend to score lower proficiency and 
conduct scores. 
AK test the relationship between the promotion probability and evaluation scores 
and find a positive relationship. In other words, the higher the scores a Marine gets from 
his supervisor, the more likely he will be promoted. Thus, they conclude that the source 
of the marriage premium in Marines’ promotion probability is the higher evaluation 
scores given by supervisors to married Marines. However, AK do not provide a specific 
reason for this conclusion. Since they don’t implement sophisticated statistical techniques 
to eliminate selection bias, they can only suggest that the reason may be either married 
Marines’ higher productivity or the selectivity of more productive Marines into marriage.  
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2. Mehay and Bowman (2004) 
In the most recent and thorough study of the marriage premium, Mehay and 
Bowman (MB) (2004) analyze “the existence and magnitude of on-the-job productivity 
differentials between married and single male employees” (p.1) and “provide evidence on 
competing explanations for any marriage-related performance differentials” (p.1). They 
use data on navy officers, based on an administrative dataset that covers male U.S. Naval 
officers who entered the Navy between 1977 and 1985. The quasi-longitudinal data 
enables them to track the officers through their first 10 years of service or until they 
separate. The data contains detailed information on marital status and career 
performance, including promotion outcomes and annual appraisals by supervisors. MB 
examine staff and line (operational) officers separately because staff officers receive 
shorter formal training and fill mostly administrative and support jobs, while line officers 
receive longer formal training periods and fill jobs in aviation, on ships, and on 
submarines.  
MB constructed three separate performance indicators.  Their first two 
performance indicators are based on performance ratings given by supervisors during two 
different career periods. Of 25 different graded items and some other additional items in 
those performance ratings, “recommended for accelerated promotion” (RAP) is validated 
as a predictor of job performance. Thus, they use receipt of an RAP as the indicator of 
performance. Their third performance measure is promotion.  MB emphasize that pay is 
not a reliable productivity in the military since “the military uses explicit fixed-length 
employment contracts and current pay is based largely on time-in-service with no 
adjustments for within-grade performance” (p.6).   
 MB find that married line officers receive 7.2 points (24%) higher ratings 
(RAP’s) than their single counterparts and that married staff officers receive 5.9 points 
(16%) higher than single staff officers in their early-career stage (years 1 through 4) . In 
the later-career stage (years 4 through 10), male line officers who are married at the 
beginning of the career stage receive a 6% (4 point)  advantage in subsequent appraisals 
received during the same career stage. Similarly, married staff personnel receive a 5% 
(3.3 point) advantage. According to MB, since the prolonged family separation of line 
officers would tend to shift household tasks to the wife, the results, which indicate that 
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the premium is smaller for staff officers, are evidence in favor of the specialization 
hypothesis. They also analyze the effect of divorce on productivity and find that the 
results for divorced line officers are consistent with the specialization hypothesis. That is, 
divorced men would display higher productivity than single men, since human capital 
accumulated during marriage does not depreciate instantly after the divorce. However, in 
the staff, there was no difference between divorced men and never-married men. 
MB also find evidence for the positive dynamic effect of marriage. Their results 
show that line officers who are married for longer periods have a 3.7 point greater 
advantage on later-career ratings than those who first marry during the early-career 
period. Although continuously married staff personnel have a 5.1 point performance 
premium, the effect of recent marriage in this group is insignificant. MB also point out 
that there is a significant effect of having children. However, they emphasize that the 
effect of length of marriage on performance is independent of the presence of children. 
MB use a different dataset to test for employer favoritism. This dataset contains 
information for 8,535 male surface specialists (within the line group) who are required to 
pass skill qualification tests in their specialty within 24 months of entering the Navy. 
These officers either passed within 24 months, or may have needed an extension and 
eventually passed the exam later, or may have failed and were transferred to a different 
specialty. Their findings were similar to their previous results. Surface personnel who 
were married at the entry point had on-time pass rates about 7 percentage points higher 
and eventual pass rates about 12 percentage points higher, than single men. These results 
are both economically and statistically significant. 
In their third performance measure, MB find that married line officers are 13% 
more likely to promote, while the promotion premium is 8% for staff officers. Again, 
they find that the premium increases with marital duration.  
MB also analyze selectivity issues. Differing from other studies, they analyze 
selection bias due to turnover. This type of selection bias exists if those who quit before 
the up-or-out promotion review are non-randomly selected. For example, if either poor 
performers, whose promotion chances are below average, or good performers, whose 
above-average skills provide them superior civilian job prospects, leave the navy at 
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higher rates, selection bias may exist. In  models, the marriage coefficient of later-career 
performance rating models falls by about 20% in both groups (as compared to the 
baseline probit results). Additionally, the estimated impact of marriage on promotion of 
line personnel in the selection adjusted model falls by about half compared to the baseline 
promotion probit model. On the other hand, the impact for staff officers becomes 
insignificant.  
MB examine selection into marriage by comparing performance differentials 
between single male officers who will marry in the future and single officers who will 
stay single in the future. “To-be-married” single personnel performed slightly better than 
those who will stay single. More important, MB point out that currently married male 
officers performed much better than their “to-be married” currently single counterparts. 
They deduce from this result that selection hypothesis appears to explain only a small 
portion of the marriage productivity premium estimates.   
Overall, MB provide a thorough analysis of the marriage premium explanations 
through an internal dataset that eliminates the influence of establishment-specific 
experiences. A potential lack of generalizability of the results based on navy personnel is 
compensated by greater precision. On the other hand, MB argue that the Navy personnel 
system appears to share many features of large, hierarchical organizations with highly 
structured internal labor markets, and thus a wider application of the results may not be as 
limited as it might appear. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Almost all of the previous studies agree that there is a robust empirical marriage 
premium. However, they do not reach a common explanation for the marriage premium. 
Disagreement stems from either methodology or the data used. Cross-sectional results 
such as Hill (1979) and Kenny (1983) do not rule out the selectivity of higher earning 
men into marriage. On the other hand, two-stage models such as Narkosteen and Zimmer 
(1987) and Chun and Lee (2001), and fixed-effects methods such as Korenmark and 
Neumark (1991), Gray (1997), Stratton (2002), and Antonovics and Town (2004) can 
deal with the selectivity problem but cannot test for employer favoritism. Loh (1996) and 
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 Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) were able to leave out employer discrimination by using 
data on self-employed workers. But a common weakness of prior studies, and one reason 





A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the Marine Corps personnel system and compares it with 
civilian personnel systems. The objective of this approach is to ensure the validity of the 
criteria used to measure the effects of marital status on the job productivity of USMC 
officers in the study. This chapter also describes the data source and presents basic 
descriptive statistics. The purpose of the preliminary analysis presented in this chapter is 
to better evaluate the effect of marital status on the productivity of male US Marine 
Corps Officers as measured by performance measures such as retention, promotion, and 
physical fitness reports.  
1. USMC Personnel System 
Similar to the personnel systems in other military services, the Marine Corps’ 
personnel system exhibits features characteristic of an internal labor market, with a 
vertical hierarchy, administrative pay setting, and up-or-out promotion (Bowman and 
Mehay, 2004). Another feature of the USMC personnel system is promotion tournaments, 
such as are commonly used within the context of internal labor markets to motivate 
workers (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000). There are 10 possible grades throughout the career 
of a USMC officer and every officer enters the system at the O-1 level. The system does 
not allow lateral entry and all promotions are from within the organization (Bowman and 
Mehay, 2004). 
2. USMC Officer Promotions  
A cohort of officers consists of all officers commissioned in a particular year. 
Officers move through their careers competing for promotion against other members of 
their cohort. USMC officers are generally considered for promotion to the next grade by 
a promotion board in accordance with the guidelines on promotion points in the Defense 
Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980.  
The USMC officer promotion process has three main elements: eligibility, 
selection, and promotion. These are interrelated and driven by: (1)  authorized strength— 
the number of officers in a particular category specified for a grade or combination of 
grades; (2)   promotion flow point— the number of years of commissioned service at 
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which most officers would be promoted to the next higher grade; and (3) promotion 
percentage—the number of officers in the promotion zone to be selected. These factors 
are interrelated and cannot be separated from each other. Table 1 shows promotion flow 
points and success rates for USMC Officers. 
Table 1. Promotion Flow Points 
Pay Grade Rank Time in Service Process Success Rate 
O-2 1st Lieutenant 2 years Fully Qualified Nearly 100% 
O-3 Captain 4 years Best Qualified Selection Board 95-100 % 
O-4 Major  9-11 years Best Qualified Selection Board 80 % 
O-5 Lieutenant Colonel 15-17 years Best Qualified Selection Board 70 % 
O-6 Colonel 21-23 years Best Qualified Selection Board 50 % 
 
Source : USMC Professional Career Development Center  
Although the success rates given in Table 1 are the target rates according to the 
statistical analysis based on the MCCOAC data used in this study, actual success rates are 
somewhat lower than the targeted rates. These rates are calculated according to the 
number of officers who are considered by the promotion boards. For example success 
rate for promotion to O-4 is calculated by dividing the number of officers which are 
promoted to O-4 with the number of officers who are considered by the O-4 promotion 
board. Actual rates are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Actual Promotion Flow 
Pay grade Rank  Time in Service Success Rate 
O-3 Captain 2 years 97 % 
O-4 Major 4 years 78 % 
O-5 Lieutenant Colonel 9-11 years 80 % 
O-6 Colonel 15-17 years 55 % 
 
Source: Author’s computations from MCCOAC data base 
According to DOPMA guidelines, the standard career progression for a typical or 
so-called due-course officer would be a promotion to O-4 at 10 years of service, O-5 at 
16 years, and O-6 at 22 years. When officers are promoted at those promotion points, 
their promotions are said to be in the “primary zone” of the promotion system. The 
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majority of officers receive their promotions in the primary zone. A small number of 
officers who show outstanding leadership potential may be promoted a year earlier. Their 
promotions are referred to as “below-the-zone” promotions. Officers who are passed over 
for promotion in the primary zone can be reconsidered for promotion a year later. 
Successful promotions at this point are referred to as being “above the zone.” 1  
Therefore, each cohort is considered for promotion to the next grade at least three 
times and at three different points: below the zone, in the primary zone, and above the 
zone. A promotion board typically promotes a small number of officers below the zone, 
the majority of officers in the primary zone, and a small number above the zone. The 
promotion opportunity to a particular pay grade, or the success rate, is computed by 
adding the number of officers selected for promotion from below, in, and above the 
primary zone and then dividing that sum by the total number of officers considered for 
promotion in the primary zone. 
As seen in Table 1, nearly all officers in the system promote to O-2 and O-3. The 
first level where competition occurs is at 10 years of service. Prior to this point, officers 
make an important decision between staying in and leaving the system. Promotion 
evaluations occur within each major occupational specialty (MOS) to achieve the target 
officer inventory or end-strength. Officers are evaluated based on their performance in 
their previous job, skill qualifications, leadership and achievements, and prior annual 
performance ratings. Of those who decide to stay to the board, those who promote to O-4 
are guaranteed 10 more years of service and a pension (Bowman and Mehay, 2004).          
The officer inventory is shaped as a pyramid with many junior officers forming 
the base and a few senior officers on the top. This structure is due to the challenge of 
promotion in higher ranks and the decision to continue or quit after O-3. The Defense 
Officer Personnel Management Act determines the number of O4-O5-O6 USMC officers 
who can be retained as a percentage of the officer corps (RAND, 1994). A promotion 
becomes effective when a vacancy opens during the fiscal year following the year that 
officers are selected for promotion.  
                                                 
1 The actual success rate seems to be lower than the projected ones. The main reason for these 
differences is the missing values that are kept in the sample but not used in the calculations of promotion 
rates. See the variable construction section.             
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3. Comparison of the Civilian Market with Navy Working 
Environments and Performance Criteria  
The working environment and performance criteria utilized in all military 
branches are similar to those of the civilian market. Two studies that compare the 
personnel system of the Navy with the civilian branches are Kol and Ryu (2002) and 
Mehay and Bowman (2004). Characteristics of the Marine Corps working environment 
are very similar to that of the Navy; both are quite different from the civilian workplace.  
According to Kol and Ryu, using military data to analyze job performance has 
both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages are the job content, the 
difficulty level of each particular job, and career paths in the military. These features are 
very similar for all service branches. Another advantage is the common characteristics of 
military officers. Therefore, fewer controls are needed to capture individual-specific 
unobservable characteristics in order to estimate reliable models using officer data. 
Further, since unobservable characteristics of officers vary less than those of civilian 
workers, a claim of self-selection bias that is attributed to various unobservable 
characteristics of each individual is weakened. The existing job rotation in the military 
often affects an officer’s performance appraisal and makes it more objective. The 
structure of the military allows an officer to be evaluated by different supervisors every 
two or three years and thus automatically decreases the chance of supervisor-specific 
evaluation bias.  
On the other hand, there are several disadvantages of using a population 
consisting of officers. In a civilian organization the supervisor is quite often the owner 
cares more about the performance of employees and consequently evaluates them more 
carefully and more objectively. However, in a military organization, the supervisor may 
not gain or lose anything directly from mis-evaluating the performance of an officer. The 
military is a public entity and supervisors are not owners. Thus, military supervisors may 
not care about the success of the organization as much as their civilian peers do. This 
claim is reinforced, especially in the old fitness-report system, by the high average  
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(inflated) ratings and the similarity of evaluation reports for different officers. In a 
civilian environment the reward and punishment systems work quickly. By contrast, in 
the military, a highly hierarchical and bureaucratic structure complicates rewarding and 
punishing officers.  
Another disadvantage of using military officers to assess performance is that most 
of the skills required for the jobs are gained from military training programs. It is not 
easy to track an officer’s accumulated human-capital investment. Moreover, officers do 
not have as many opportunities to invest their human capital on their own as do their 
civilian peers. However, the fact that firm-specific training is similar for all officers 
means that this characteristic is negatively homogenous.  
Another issue of military data hinges on the indicators of on-the-job productivity. 
Although the three indicators based on fitness reports, retention, and promotion are 
commonly used to measure an officer’s productivity, they are accepted as indirect proxy 
measures. Another issue is the “up-or-out” promotion system in the military. Promotions 
are highly dependent on vacancies in the next grade. For example, if few vacancies exist, 
successful officers may be passed up or forced to leave. At the other extreme, officers 
with poor performance may be promoted if there are many openings in the next grade. In 
both cases, the promotion outcome may not be an ideal indication of an officer’s 
productivity.  
Mehay and Bowman (2004) also mention the advantages and disadvantages of 
using military data for analyzing the effect of marital status on employee job 
productivity.  One of the main strengths is that several performance measures are 
available for each worker and the indicators capture performance throughout an 
employee’s tenure rather than at a single career point. In addition, different than civilian 
data, military data controls for some key aspects such as career ladders, job assignment, 
and promotion policies.  
Mehay and Bowman (2004) also mention that “military data are minimizing the 
effects of unmeasured firm heterogeneity and individual heterogeneity by controlling for 
differences in jobs, occupations, and labor supply, all of which may differ by marital 
status.” However, on the other hand, they also mention that “the tradeoff in using internal 
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data is that greater precision in estimated effects is often obtained at the expense of 
generalizability.” Shared features of the Navy’s and private firms’ personnel systems are 
stated by them as:  
Tenure in the lowest three grades is between 3 and 4 years, promotion to 
grade 4 is a crucial point for career advancement, and upper level jobs 
(above grade 4) are characterized as pertaining to general management, 
managing larger groups, coordinating across units, or strategic planning.  
(Mehay and Bowman, 2004)   
B. DATA SOURCE 
The data used in this study consists of information about Marine Corps officers 
who were commissioned between the years 1980-1999. The raw-data file itself was 
obtained originally from the Center for Naval Analysis via Professor William Bowman at 
the U.S. Naval Academy. The dataset was constructed by following the methods in Ergun 
(2003). The main data file was shaped by first combining two datasets: the Marine Corps 
Commissioned Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) data file and Marine Corps annual 
fitness report files. Since the USMC performance evaluation system was modified after 
1999, fitness report files gathered between the years 1980-1998 are classified as “old” 
fitness report files, and the ones gathered between the years 1999-2001 are classified as 
“new” fitness report files. Only old fitness reports are used in this study. The MCCOAC 
data file and fitness report datasets were combined by matching the Social Security 
Numbers (SSN) of each individual.  
After forming the data in a wide (longitudinal) format, we converted it to a long 
(panel) format. Both panel and longitudinal data are used in the study. We use 
longitudinal data for promotion and retention models since we focus on different specific 
time points, such as promotion to O-4 and O-5. However, panel data is preferred for 
observing the potentially time-varying effect of marriage and the number of non-spousal 
dependents on each of the 20 Marine Corps officer cohorts. It is used in both the PI and 
the supervisor favoritism models. Table 3 and Table 4 present examples of the two data 
formats. In the panel data format, the time variable is created by using ranks. Thus, each 
individual has up to 5 observations depending on their retention and promotion. After this 
transformation, we are able to eliminate individual-specific characteristics of each officer.     
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111111 S S M 0 0 1 22 
222222 M M M 2 2 2 23 
 
Table 4. Long (Panel) Format 
Social Security 
Number Time Marital Status 
Number of 
Dependents Comm. Age 
1111111 1 S 0 22 
1111111 2 S 0 22 
1111111 3 M 1 22 
2222222 1 M 2 23 
2222222 2 M 2 23 
2222222 3 M 2 23 
Since subjective appraisals may be open to favoritism, one approach to test for 
employer discrimination is to examine a more objective output indicator (Mehay and 
Bowman, 2004).  For an objective indicator, we add the actual physical fitness, pistol and 
rifle scores, to the data derived from the MCCOAC file. The main objective of adding 
this information is to create variables that cannot be manipulated by supervisors. Since 
supervisors do not control these scores and they are direct measures of military 
performance, this information provides an opportunity to examine the marriage premium 
more objectively and to test for employer (supervisor) favoritism.  
 The data contains the marital status of each Marine Corps officer at several 
different points: (1) at entry; (2) at O-1; (3) at O-2; (4) at O-3; (5) at O-4; and (6) at O-5. 
Because of the lack of certainty of marriage and divorce dates in the data, we assume that 
the recorded marital status at these ranks reflects the status in the middle of the rank. 
However, since the dependent variables capture performance throughout the period, the 
marital status used is the one for the previous period, which also is at the beginning of 
each career period. According to this assumption, for example, when performance 
through O-3 is considered, we use the marital status at O-2, which provides certain 




1. MCCOAC Data Set  
The MCCOAC data set contains 20 cohorts and includes 27,458 observations. 
The last observation date for each individual is 30 September 2000. Cohort sizes for 
different fiscal years are presented in Figure 1. 





























Since the main interest in this study is the effect of marital and dependency status 
on promotion, retention, and the job productivity of USMC officers, we first compute the 
changes in marital status by rank. Table 5 presents married officer percentages at each 
rank together with the percentage changes between the ranks. It seems from Table 5 that 
there are quite enough shifts in marital status, from not married to married, beginning 
from the early-career points (O-1) going towards the senior ranks (O5). The percent of 
officers married in each grade rises from only 30% in O-1 to 93% in grade O-5.  




Number of Cohorts 
Available 
Average % of Married Officers 
and Computed  % Increases  
O-1 20 30.89 % 
O-2 19 44.61 % (13.72 % increase) 
O-3 17 61.10 % (16.49 % increase) 
O-4 11 86.10 % (24.91 % increase) 
O-5 5 93.14 % (7.13 % increase) 
 
Source: Author’s computations from MCCOAC data base 
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Promotion to O-4 is the up-or-out decision point in the system. The percentage 
increase of married officers from O-3 to O-4 is really remarkable according to Table 5. 
The average USMC officer commissioning age2 is found to be 23, and on average USMC 
officers are 27 years old when they are O-3. Since most of them build a career until this 
point and are young enough to get married, this period is very suitable for marriage. 
Similarly from O-4 to O-5 there is also a high increase in the percent of married 
individuals.  
Table 6 presents some statistics about the number of married and not married 
officers at O-3, O-4, and after the O-4 point.  
Table 6. Marital Statuses, Retention, and Promotion  










Married 7,673 5,973 4,934 .78 .83 
Not married 8,821 3,126 2,514 .35 .80 
 
The number of officers who do not stay until the O-4 promotion board are the 
officers who voluntarily leave. If we combine the results presented in Table 5 and Table 
6, we can say that married officers are more likely to stay in the military and married 
officers are very dominant at later ranks.    
A second interest of the study was the change in the dependency status or number 
of dependents. Figure 2 presents the general trend of non-spousal dependency status 








                                                 
2 Commissioning age varied from 21 to 29 in the data. The average age is used here.  
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Figure 2.   Non-Spousal Dependency Status  










O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5
 
Similar to the trend in marriage, the number of U.S. Marine Corps officers who 
have non-spousal dependents constantly increases throughout an officer’s career. This 
increase is quite logical given the high correlation between marriage and having children. 
Another point of concern may be the decision to leave or stay. Table 7 presents statistics 
about officers who are at the retention decision point. 














Dependents 4,284 3,124 2,859 .73 .92 
Without 
Dependents 13,372 6,235 4,703 .47 .75 
 
It seems from the table that officers who have non-spousal dependents stay at 
higher rates than officers who do not have non-spousal dependents.  
2. Old and New Fitness Report Data Files 
The old fitness report data files are also used by Ergun (2003). The old fitness 
report data file consists of information on reporting senior (RS) markings for the 20 items 
                                                 
3 Dependents here do not include spouses. 
4 Total number of officers who are promoted to O-4 and who survived O-4 board are more than the 
same total numbers presented in Table 6. The main reason for this difference is the missing marital status 
and number of dependents values in the data. Available marital status values are less than the available 
number of dependents values.  
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in Section B of the fitness reports. The old fitness reports include information on fitness 
reports submitted until the year 1998, and there are 27 fitness reports per officer on 
average in the data. 
The U.S. Marine Corps began to use the new fitness reports officially after 1999. 
Both Ergun (2003) and Lianez and Zamarripa (2003) used these data in their studies. The 
last file in the data is dated August 2001. The new fitness report data file consists of 
reporting senior (RS) evaluations on 14 traits in the new fitness reports and each officer 
has 3 new fitness reports, on average. However, since the new fitness reports are so few 
and cover only two years of observations, only old fitness report files are used in this 
study. 
3. Construction of Variables 
There are three types of dependent variables in this study. These are PI, 
promotion and retention variables. Marital status, dependency status, accumulated years 
of marriage, and the to-be-married status are the focus variables. For other variables 
included in the models, we used variables defined the same way the same way as in 
Ergun (2003) used to create his variables.  
a. Performance Index Variables 
Performance characteristics (item 13) and professional qualities (item 14) 
graded in the Fitreps are selected for the construction of the PI. Performance 
characteristics consist of regular duties, additional duties, administrative duties, handling 
officers, handling enlisted personnel, training personnel, and tactical handling of the 
troops sub items. Professional qualities include endurance, personal appearance, attention 
to duty, military presence, cooperation, initiative, judgment, presence of mind, force, 
leadership, loyalty, personal relations, economy of management, and growth potential sub 
items. In the original dataset these items are graded qualitatively in 6 different levels that 
range from unsatisfactory to outstanding. In order to make a quantitative research, we 
converted these grades from 1 to 6 and then took the average of these sub-items. Grades 
that are marked “Not Observed” are converted as missing. Since there is more than one 
fitrep per person within the same rank, the average of the outcomes of these fitreps is 
taken and converted to 0-100 scale in order to create PI.  
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b. Promotion to O-4 and O-5 variables 
Promotion to O-4 and promotion to O-5 variables are created as dummy 
variables that show whether officers were promoted to these ranks or not. Officers who 
have last-pay-grade information regarding these ranks are accepted as promoted. If an 
officer does not have available last-pay-grade information, we checked whether the this 
officer has the dates of acquiring these ranks in his records. We improved the accuracy of 
the promotion variables by examining the MCCOAC dataset, which helps to verify if the 
officer has a recorded fitrep in these ranks. Finally, for the fourth grade we accepted 
officers promoted to major who have served more than 120 months. The fifth grade is not 
appropriate for such correction by using number of months served since there is no time 
limit for serving in O-4.  
c. Retained 10 Years in Service Variable 
The 10 year retention in service variable is created as a dummy variable 
that shows whether officers were retained 10 years or not. Since 10 years in service 
requires 120 months of service time, the officers who served more than 120 months are 
accepted as retained.  
d. Focus Variables  
The Headquarters Master Files (HMF) provides information about marital 
status and the number of dependents at different time points for each officer. We 
converted marital status information into dummy variables that represent being married 
or not at each rank. In order to test the difference between currently married and those 
currently single who will be married in the future, we created a “to-be-married” dummy 
variable. This variable is formed by observing if an officer who is single at the current 
rank will be married at a later rank or not. Additionally, for the supervisor favoritism 
model, matches between marital statuses of supervisors and officers are created as 
dummy variables.   
In order to test the dynamic structure of marital status or performance we 
created a continuous variable that shows the accumulated years in marriage. The 
assumption we used here is that a marital status change occurs in the middle of the time 
spent in each rank. Table 8 displays the logic behind the calculations of accumulated 
marriage years in the following examples. Suppose, for example, an officer is recorded as 
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unmarried at O-1, married at O-2, and married at O-3. In computing the accumulated 
years in marriage up to O-4, we assumed that this officer accumulated 7 marriage years. 
Of these 7 years, 1 year comes from O-2 and 6 years from O-3. Similarly, suppose that an 
officer is recorded as unmarried at O-1 and O-2, but married at O-3 and O-4 and finally 
divorced at O-5. We assumed that this second officer accumulated 10.5 marriage years. 
Of these 10.5 years, 3 year comes from O-3, 5 years from O-4 and 2.5 years from O-5 
until the divorce point, which is supposed to be in the middle of the period. 
Table 8. Accumulated Marriage Years Variable Construction  
Example 2                                                 3 years            5 years         2.5 years       
Example 1                         1 year          6 years                
 
 
Event -1          O-1       Marriage    Marriage    O-4                         O-5           
Event -2          O-1       O-2  O-3       Marriage     O-4                         O-5     Divorce 
 
The number of dependents is already provided in the raw data. However, 
this information includes spouses as dependents. In order to obtain the number of non-
spousal dependents, we subtracted one from the number of dependents if the officer is 
married at that point.      
C. SAMPLES FOR STATISTICAL MODELS  
In order to better measure the potential affects of marriage on the retention, 
promotion, and on-the-job productivity of USMC officers, this study utilizes different 
officer samples for each performance model.  Each sample is described below. 
1. The Sample for the Performance Index (PI) Models  
Although the traits used in the evaluations and the grading scales are different in 
old and new fitness reports (fitreps), since the results with new fitreps are generally 
insignificant we analyzed only the old fitreps. For old fitness reports 5 different PI 
variables were created for each rank. Table 9 explains the total number of observations 
available for each sample used to analyze the old fitrep performance index. 
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Table 9. Sample Sizes for Old Fitness Report PI  
Sample Sizes Explanation O-1  O-2  O-3  O-4  O-5  
Cohorts 1980-1997 1980-1995 1980-1994 1980-1990 1980-1983 
Sample Size 27,458 22,697 17,656 8,165 1,526 
Observation 
number 18,312 20,151 14,904 5,059 454 
 
2. The Sample for the O-4 Promotion Model 
The sample used for the promotion model is similar to that for the retention model 
and also includes information for officers who were  accessed between FY 1980 and 
1990. The sample consists of 16,351 officers. As Ergun (2003) mentions, although the 
data do not include promotion board results, we can measure the number of months to the 
O-4 date of rank. Over the years, promotion time to O-4 fell from 144 months to 113 
months.  
Of the 16,351 initial entrants in this sample, 10,158 survived until the O-4 
promotion board. Nevertheless, the statistical analysis reveal that, 8,165 USMC officers 
out of 10,158 promoted to O-4.  Sixty-six percent of those who promoted to O-4 were 
married, whereas 34% were not. The promotion success rate is 42.2% for the entry cohort 
as a whole and 80% for the officers who survived until the promotion board.5 Table 10 
summarizes the steps taken to reach the final dataset.   
Table 10. O-4 Promotion Model Sample 
Explanation Observations Percentage of Initial Sample 
FY 1980-1990 Cohort 16,351 100 % 
Missing Values 174 0.01 % 
Officers who did not  
Survive O-4 Board 6,019 36.8  % 
Final Sample Size 10,158 62.1 % 
Officers who Promoted to O-4  6,908 42.2 % 
 
3. The Sample for the O-5 Promotion Model 
This sample includes information on officers in the 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983 
cohorts. There are 3,294 total observations in the sample. The statistical analysis revealed 
that the promotion time to O-5 fell from 212 months to 191 months for this sample. Of 
the 3,294 initial entrants in this sample, 2774 survived until the O-5 promotion board and 
                                                 
5 See Table 2 For actual success rates . 
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1,526 promoted to O-5. The success rate is 46.3% for the entry cohort and 55% for the 
officers who survived until the promotion board.6  88.24% of the officers who promoted 
to O-5 are married; the rest are not married. Table 11 summarizes the steps mentioned 
above. 
Table 11. O-4 Promotion Model Sample 
Explanation Observations Percentage of Initial Sample 
FY 1980-1983 cohort 3,294 100 % 
Missing Values 174 5.2 % 
Officers who did not  
Survive O-5 Board 346 10.6  % 
Final Sample Size 2,774 84.2 % 
Officers who Promoted to O-4  1,526 46.3 % 
 
4. The Sample for the 10 YCS Retention Model 
This sample includes information belonging to officers who accessed between FY 
1980 and 1990. The initial sample consists of 16,351 officers. Of these 16,351 USMC 
officers, 7,438 left the military before reaching 120 months of service and 6,908 officers 
stayed. The remaining 2,005 officers have missing 10-year retention values. Since 
retention is a voluntary decision, 2,514 officers who were involuntarily discharged due to 
health problems, failure in basic training, or failure of promotion to O-2 or O-3 are 
deleted. The final dataset contains 13,837 observations. Table 12 summarizes the steps 
taken to reach the final dataset. 
Table 12. 10 YCS Retention Model Sample 
Explanation Observations Percentage of Initial Sample 
FY 1980-1990 Cohort 16,351 100 % 
Missing Values 2,005 12.3 % 
Officers who left involuntarily 2,514 15.3  % 
Final Sample Size 11,832 73.4 % 
Officers who retained 
10YCS  6,908 42 %  
Similar to the analysis presented in the MCCOAC data file section, Figure 3 
shows the percent of married officers over time. It seems that the probability of marriage 
as an event reaches the highest point before the retention decision for most fiscal years.  
 
                                                 
6 See Table 2 For actual success rates. 
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5. The Sample for the Supervisor Favoritism Model 
In this study we tried to test whether there is any supervisor favoritism and, if so, 
whether it explains any potential marriage premium. We use direct observations for 
supervisor favoritism. Each supervisor is tracked and their marital status information is 
derived from the HMF files. Their marital status of each reporting senior (supervisor) is 
matched and compared with the officers they rated by benefiting from MCCOAC dataset. 
The intention was to examine whether any potential bias arises when the marital status of 
the supervisor and the officer match. The hypothesis of supervisor bias would be 
supported, for example, if married reporting seniors are more likely to rate married 
officers more favorably. 
While constructing the sample for this analysis, we first acquired information 
about fitness reports for all officers in different ranks from the MCCOAC dataset. The 
initial MCCOAC dataset contains 1,223,479 fitness reports. We excluded 417,378 fitness 
reports submitted for situations in which the supervisor worked less than 3 months with 
the officer who was evaluated.7 By comparing the HMF dataset with the MCCOAC 
dataset, we matched 110,112 observations including officers’ demographic information 
and reporting seniors’ marital status at the rank they submitted the fitness reports. Finally, 
                                                 
7 Marine Corps Order P1610.7E restricted 90 days of work as a limit for filing a fitness report. Fitness 
reports based on performance appraisals through a period less than 90 days are declared as not so valuable.  
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we excluded 18,459 observations due to missing fitrep values. Table 13 presents a 
summary of the steps used to construct the analysis sample.  







Percentage of officers  
FY 1980-1999 cohort 27678 1-26 100 % 
Reports submitted for less 
than 90 days work period 
4291 1-7 15.5 % 
Observations that do not 
match    
7102 1-13 25.6  % 
Missing Fitrep values  1514 1-3 5.4 % 
Final Sample Size 14771 1-18 53.36 % 
In the final sample, 14,771 officers have a total of 91,653 fitness reports. 67,874 
of these fitness reports were done by married reporting seniors and 23,779 were done by 
unmarried seniors. Since a majority of the reporting seniors have long work experience 
and are older, this statistic is quite logical. Table 14 summarizes the distribution of the 
observations by the rank and marital status of the reporting seniors (RS) versus the 
marital status of the recorded officers (RO). This sample does not include the fitreps of 
the recorded officers who are in grade O-5, because the marital status of officers in higher 
ranks than O-5 is not available in the HMF dataset. 
Table 14. Distribution of Fitreps by rank and by marital status of RSs and ROs 
Explanation O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 
Married RS to Married RO 14.4% 16.0% 21.8% 34.4% 
Married RS to Single RO 50.9% 52.4% 56.6% 40.4% 
Single RS to Single RO 23.2% 20.6% 11.9% 11.7% 
Single RS to Married RO 6.2% 6.1% 4.1% 10.1% 
% of Married RO 21.8% 23.9% 44.9% 67.3% 
Total Observations 28,408 36,606 23,974 2,665 
 
D. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS  
This section provides a preliminary data analysis before developing multivariate 
models. In each subsection, one hypothesis is tested by performing a t-test and assessing 
the difference in means. In addition, the means, standard deviations, and p-values are 
provided for each variable and the tests. For binary variables, the mean value represents 
the percentage of observations for which the variable is observed (or has a value of 1).  
The hypotheses tested are: 
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Ho :  There is no difference in means for both married and unmarried USMC officers 
Ha :  There is a significant difference in means in favor of married USMC officers    
All T-tests performed are between married and single officers and are one-tailed 
tests.  
1. Performance Index (PI) 
Table 15 presents average PIs for married and unmarried USMC officers at 5 
different grades. Although the panel data format is utilized in the PI model estimations, in 
order to better analyze the data, we benefited from longitudinal format data for this 
section. It is quite remarkable that, although the PI mean values are highly inflated and all 
of them are above 96, there are still some significant differences at O-2 (significant at 
.10) and at O-5. For 368 officers at O-5, the overall average PI is 99.95; and throughout 5 
different ranks, from O-1 to O-5, there is a constant average PI increase. Besides this 
trend, there is also a significant difference in average PIs among married and unmarried 
officers in favor of married USMC officers. The T-test revealed a similar result for O-2’s 
but it is only significant at .10 level. However, for O-1, O-3, and O-4 the analysis 
revealed no significant differences. 
Table 15. Average PIs by Marital Status 
Marital Status N Means (Standard Deviations) 
PI for O-1 
Married at 
Accession 12323 96.63 (4.23)     
Single at Accession 5238 95. 87 (4.64)     
T-Test  t =10.50    (P < t = 1.000) 
PI for O-2 
Married at O-1 10339 97.63 (3.64)     
 Single at O-1 8981 97.70 (3.24)     
T-Test  t = -1.39    (P < t = 0.0830) 
PI for O-3 
Married at O-2 7219 98.66 (2.82)     
 Single at O-2 6542 98. 70 (3.11)     
T-Test  t = -0.74    (P < t = 0.2296) 
PI for O-4 
Married at O-3 1531 99.49 (1.83)     
 Single at O-3 3263 99.55 (1.62)     
T-Test  t = -1.05    (P < t = 0.14) 
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Table 15.    Average PIs by Marital Status (Cont.) 
Marital Status N Means (Standard Deviations) 
PI for O-5 
Married at O-4 42 99.82 (0.78)     
 Single at O-4 326 99.97 (0.20)     
T-Test  t = -2.84    (P < t = 0.0024) 
2. Promotion and Retention 
Table 16 has t-test results for three different samples. Sample 1 shows O-4 
promotion rates of 17,656 USMC officers by marital status. The promotion rate is .48 for 
married and .38 for unmarried officers. The T-test showed that this difference is 
significant. Sample 2 compares O-5 promotion rates of 5,338 USMC officers by marital 
status. The promotion rate is .25 for married and .21 for unmarried officers. The T-test 
showed that this difference is significant. Sample 3 provides comparison between 10-year 
retention rates of 16,170 USMC officers by marital status. The retention rate is .48 for 
married and .39 for unmarried officers. The T-test showed that this difference is 
significant. 
Table 16. Promotion and Retention Rates by Marital Status 
Mean (Std. Deviation) Sample Married O-3 N 
Promotion to O-4 
Single 6,618 0.38 (0.49) 
Married 10,396 0.48 (0.50) 
T-Test t = -12.20    (P < t = 0.000) 
1 
Married O-4 N Promotion to O-5 
Single 747 0.21 (0.41)   
Married 4,591 0.25 (0.45) 
T-Test t = -2.70    (P < t = 0.0035) 
2 
Married O-3 N 10 YCS Retention 
Single 5,518   0.39 (0.0066)    
Married 9,704   0.48 (0.0051)    
T-Test”  t =-10.73     (P < t = 0.0000) 
3 
 
3. Supervisor Favoritism  
Although the panel format data is utilized in the supervisor favoritism model 
estimations, in order to better analyze the data, we benefited from the longitudinal format 
of the supervisor favoritism dataset in this section. Table 17 presents the T-test statistics 
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of the mean PI value differences by rank for matches of the marital statuses of RSs and 
ROs. The tests indicate that average values of PIs where married RSs matches with the 
married ROs are higher then the average values of PIs where they don’t match only for 
O-1 fitreps. Interestingly, in the other grades, the mean values of the PIs given by married 
RSs to single ROs are significantly greater than the mean values of the PIs given in other 
possible matches. Besides, for the first two grades, single supervisors evaluate single 
officers with higher scores. Thus, our preliminary analysis does not support the 
favoritism hypothesis.  
Table 17. Average PIs by Marital Status Matches Between RSs and ROs 
Marital Status 
Match N Means (Standard Deviations) 
PI for O-1 
Married to Married 4,102 97.34 (4.46)     
No match 24,306 97.05 (4.69)     
T-Test  t =-3.73 (P < t = 0.0001) 
Married to Single 14,484 97.12 (4.65)     
 No match 13,924 97.07 (4.66)     
T-Test  t = -0.863    (P < t = 0.1941) 
Single to Married 1,784 97.09 (4.63)     
 No match 26,624 97.09 (4.66)     
T-Test  t = 0.035    (P < t = 0.5140) 
Single to Single 6,581 97.40 (4.10)     
 No match 21,827 97 (4.81)     
T-Test  t = -6.11    (P < t = 0.0001) 
PI for O-2 
Married to Married 5,870 98.13 (4.28)     
No match 30,736 98.39 (3.73)     
T-Test  t =4.85 (P < t = 1.000) 
Married to Single 19,200 98.47 (3.63)     
 No match 17,406 98.21 (4.01)     
T-Test  t = -6.61    (P < t = 0.0000) 
Single to Married 2,225 98.10 (4.03)     
 No match 34,381 98.37 (3.81)     
T-Test  t = 3.16    (P < t = 0.99) 
Single to Single 7,552 98.45 (3.56)     
 No match 29,054 98.33 (3.89)     






Table 17.  Average PIs by Marital Status Matches Between RSs and ROs (Cont.) 
PI for O-3 
Married to Married 5,237 99.19 (2.96)     
No match 18,737 99.29 (2.40)     
T-Test  t =2.42 (P < t = 0.99) 
Married to Single 13,569 99.41 (2.19)     
 No match 10,405 99.07 (2.91)     
T-Test  t = -10.23    (P < t = 0.0000) 
Single to Married 977 98.34 (3.99)     
 No match 22,997 99.30 (2.44)     
T-Test  t = 11.71    (P < t = 1.000) 
Single to Single 2,847 99.98 (2.78)     
 No match 21,127 99.30 (2.49)     
T-Test  t = 6.4    (P < t = 1.000) 
PI for O-4 
Married to Married 917 99.55 (1.50)     
No match 1,748 99.47 (2.64)     
T-Test  t =-0.93 (P < t = 0.1775) 
Married to Single 1,076 99.63 (1.28)     
 No match 1,589 99.41 (2.79)     
T-Test  t = -2.37    (P < t = 0.0088) 
Single to Married 270 99.88 (5.47)     
 No match 2,395 99.57 (1.59)     
T-Test  t = 4.62    (P < t = 1.000) 
Single to Single 312 99.49 (1.67)     
 No match 2,353 99.50 (2.38)     
T-Test  t = 0.0945    (P < t = 0.5376) 
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discusses briefly the USMC personnel and officer promotion system. 
It also describes the three different data files used in the analysis: the MCCOAC file, the 
old fitrep data file, and the new fitrep data file. The construction of dependent and focus 
variables is explained in detail. By defining five different performance models and 
forming different samples for them at different observation points, we tried to analyze the 
existence of a marriage and dependency premium. Our preliminary analysis indicates that 
married officers and officers with additional non-spousal dependents perform better in 
















In the preliminary analysis, the marriage premium was obtained by estimating the 
differences in mean values of performance indicators between married and single 
personnel. This chapter specifies multivariate models that include other covariates to 
explain the variation in the performance indicators. The model specifications are based 
on the models used by North and Goldhaber (1995), Hosek et. al. (2001), Ergun (2003), 
and Kol and Ryu (2002). 
In all models, marital- and dependent-related variables are the focus variables. 
Other explanatory variables are selected from personal, demographic, and job-related 
characteristics, as well as cognitive capability, experience, and compatibility to military 
jobs. Each model explanation includes the related hypothesis tested in the model, the 
specification of the model, and the hypothesized relationship of the included explanatory 
variables. The model specifications contain both baseline models and selection models.   
B. PERFORMANCE INDEX MODELS 
1. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 will answer the question whether married personnel perform better than 
single personnel according to performance evaluation outcomes. The first hypothesis of 
the performance models is that married male Marine officers receive higher performance 
scores than their single counterparts. Hypothesis 1 is stated below where m reperesents 
the marital status of marine officers. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 will test whether the marriage premium is related to the years spent in 
marriage. This hypothesis is based on human capital investment and household 
specialization theories which logically require that more years spent in marriage provide 
Hypothesis 1 
Ho : PIm=1 = PI m=0 
HA : PI m=1 > PI m=0 
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more labor market specialization and/or human capital accumulation and consequently 
more marriage premium gained. Hypothesis 3 is that each additional year in marriage 
results in a higher marriage premium for married male officers where m represents the 
marital status of marine officers and n represents the number of years spent in marriage. 
 
Hypothesis 3 will test if having more non-spousal dependents increases the performance 
of married male officers. The relationship between dependents and productivity can be 
hypothesized in two different ways. According to the household specialization theory, 
more dependents may lead Marine officers to specialize less in labor market activities 
due to their increase in the household activities. On the contrary, the greater 
responsibility caused by more dependents may motivate officers to work harder and 
perform better. Additionally, the magnitude of the effect of dependents may also be 
related to the marital status. Thus, hypothesis 3 is that having additional non-spousal 
dependents increases the performance scores of officers. This hypothesis is presented 




Hypothesis 4 will address the question whether the marriage premium is uniquely related 
to marriage. To test this hypothesis, the performances of married officers, officers who 
are not married but who will marry in the future grades (to-be-married), and officers who 
are not married and who will not marry in the future grades (to-be-single) will be 
compared.  If “to-be-married” officers’ performance is not different from “to-be-single” 
officers’ performance, the selectivity hypothesis which states that the marriage premium 
is due to better-performing officers’ selection into marriage will be rejected. The fourth 
hypothesis is that married officers’ performance is higher than “to-be-married” officers’ 
Hypothesis 3 
Ho : PIn+1 = PI n 
HA : PI n+1 > PI n+1 
Hypothesis 2 
Ho : PIm=1,n+1 = PI m=1,n 
HA : PI m=1,n+1> PI m=1,n+1 
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performance, whose performance is not different from “to-be-single” officers’. This 
hypothesis is presented below where s represents the current or the future marital status 
of the officer.  
 
 
2. Model Specification 
a. POLS Model Specification 
There are four identical model specifications for hypotheses in which only 
the focus variables differ. The first model is to estimate the marriage premium in PI by 
controlling marital/dependent-related variables, demographics, commissioning age, 
commissioning fiscal years, job-related characteristics, cognitive ability, commissioning 
sources and job experience.  
Table 18. OLS Multivariate Regression Model Specifications for PI 
where other control variables are commissioning age, ethnicity group, gct score, tbs 
overall class rank percentile, commissioning source, and commissioning fiscal years. 
b. FE Model Specification 
The fixed-effects technique is widely used in the literature on the marriage 
premium to test selectivity into marriage by eliminating the effects of unobservable, 
individual-specific factors that correlate with high wages and cause a bias in the marriage 
dummy coefficient. The fixed effects model simply takes the difference between each 
value in different observations and the average of those values over time for each 
individual. The original model is presented below where ia  = unobservable 
heterogeneity. 
5,4,3,2,1,10 =−++= tuaXPI itiitit ββ  
Hypothesis 4 
Ho : PIs=married = PIs=to-be-married = PIs=to-be-single 
HA : PIs=married≠ PI s=to-be-married = PIs=to-be-single 
PI = β0 + β1 (Marital Status/ Married vs. To-be-married/ 
Accumulated Married Years / Number of Dependents) + other 
control variables. 
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The transformation of the fixed effects technique is presented below where the dependent 
variable is the time-demeaned data on PI. Xit represents both observable and 
unobservable characteristics in the tth time point for the ith officer. 
( ) ( ) 5,4,3,2,1,1 =+−=− tuXXPIPI itiitiit β  
The model specifications for the fixed-effect are presented below: 
Table 19. Fixed-Effects Model Specifications for PI 
 
Other control variables are commissioning age, ethnicity group, gct score,, tbs 
overall class rank percentile, commissioning source, commissioning fiscal year. 
c. Heckman Model Specification 
While testing the first four hypotheses on PI for O-4 and O-5, we used the 
Heckman procedure. Since there is a potential bias in some coefficients due to the 
retention decision, there is a need to control for selection bias. In other words, because of 
the officers who leave, the sample may not be a representative sample of all officers. In 
one case, the officers who left before O-4 may be the better ones who have better civilian 
job prospects. The officers who stay are lower performers. This will create a downward 
bias. However, on the other hand, the officers who leave before O-4 may be lower 
performers who believe that they have less of a promotion chance. In this case, the 
sample will be filled with good officers and thus will create an upward bias.  
The Heckman procedure obtains an “Inverse Mills Ratio” for each 
observation in the survival sample. The ‘Inverse Mills Ratio’ represents the probability 
that an officer survives to the promotion board of the given grade. The procedure requires 
that the first-stage survival equation include at least one instrumental variable that is 
related to retention, but not related to the performance index. As Table 20 shows, MOS 
groups and prior enlisted service are used as instrumental variables in the survival 
equations and excluded from the second-stage PI models. 
( )iit PIPI −  = β1(Marital Status/ Married vs. To-be-married/ Accumulated 
Married Years / Number of Dependents)it — Average(Marital Status/ Married vs. 
To-be-married/ Accumulated Married Years / Number of Dependents)i] + other  
control variables  
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Different MOS groups are used as instrumental variables because there is 
a connection between MOS and retention. One particular MOS group may have better job 
opportunities in civilian life then others, and this difference affects the retention decision. 
However, there is not so much relationship between MOS groups and the PIs received, 
which supports omitting these variables from the PI model.   
Being priorly enlisted is another instrumental variable and is an indicator 
of taste for the military. Being priorly enlisted may result from receiving better PIs in 
early periods. Therefore, we can assume that, generally, being priorly enlisted is not 
related to receiving better PIs. On the other hand, it is a factor for retention. It is an 
indicator of taste and priorly enlisted officers may establish stronger ties to the military 
than non-priorly enlisted officers. 
Table 20. Heckman Model Specifications for PI 
 
 
In the model specification above, i is the grade of the officer and other factors are 
commissioning age, ethnicity group, TBS overall class rank percentile, commissioning 
source, commissioning fiscal year. 
3. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
Table 21 lists the explanatory variables and their hypothesized relationship to PI. 
Of the focus variables, being married, additional years in marriage, and having 
dependents are expected to be positively related to the PI, while to-be-married is 
supposed to be no different than to-be-single, which are both negative when compared to 
currently married officers. The first recorded GCT scores of the Marine officers are used 
as a proxy of their cognitive ability and are expected to be positively related to the PI. 
Although there is no reported discrimination based on ethnicity in USMC performance 
Selection Equation 
 




2. PI(Oi) = β0 + β1(Marital Status/ Married vs. To-be-married/ Accumulated 
Married Years / Number of Dependents) + other factors , i=4,5 
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evaluation, African Americans, Hispanics, and Other Race groups are expected to receive 
lower performance scores relative to White officers. The commissioning fiscal year is 
expected to be positive since it is used to capture the score inflation over time.  
The Basic School (TBS) overall class-rank percentile is used as a proxy for job-
related characteristics. This variable is the average of TBS leadership and the academic 
and military class-rank percentiles. Quester and Hiatt (2001) use the TBS class ranks as a 
proxy for the officer’s quality. North and Goldhaber (1995) state that, regardless of the 
measure, the TBS leadership class percentile is associated with higher success rates. 
Ergun also estimates similar results with the TBS overall class-rank percentile. Thus, it is 
expected that this variable is positively related to the PI. Ergun also finds that ECP, MCP, 
PLC, and OCC commissioning sources have a negative effect on PI relative to USNA.  
 
Table 21. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on PI 
Variable Group Variable Name Variable Description Expected Sign 
Hypothesis 1 Married 
Divorced 
Married at previous rank 
Divorced at previous rank 
+ (compared 
to not married) 
Hypothesis 2 Accmaryear Additional Marriage Years + 
Hypothesis 3 Numkidsprev Number of Dependents at the 
previous rank 
+ 
Marr_curr Currently Married + 
To-be-married Currently not married but 
will marry in the future 
? 
Hypothesis 4 
To-be-single Currently not married and 
will not marry in the future 
(base marital status) 
Comm._age Commissioning age + 
White White (base ethnicity group) 
Africaname African American - 
Hispanic Hispanic - 
Personal Characteristics 
Otherrace Other Race - 
Job-related 
characteristics 
Tbsperc TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 
+ 
Cognitive ability f_gct First recorded GCT score + 
Usna USNA (base comm. source) 
Nrotc NROTC + 
Pl PLC - 
Occ OCC - 
Mecep MECEP + 
Ecp ECP - 
Commissioning sources 
Mcp MCP - 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Year 




C. SUPERVISOR FAVORITISM MODEL 
1. Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 5 will answer the question whether married supervisors give higher 
performance evaluations to married officers than to single officers. In order to test this 
hypothesis, the marital status of supervisors and their subordinates are matched. If 
married officers are found to receive higher fitreps from married supervisors rather than 
single supervisors, or if single officers are found to receive lower fitreps from married 
supervisors as compared to single supervisors, the potential marriage premium will be 
upward biased due to supervisor favoritism. This hypothesis is presented below where sm 
is the marital status of the supervisor and om is the marital status of the recorded officer.  
    
2. Model Specifications 
a. POLS Model Specification 
Two successive model specifications are implemented. The first model 
specification has the same control variables in the PI models. Performance evaluations 
that are given by married supervisors to married officers, by married supervisors to single 
officers, and by single supervisors to single officers are compared according to their 
association with performance evaluations that are given by single supervisors to married 
officers. In the second model specification, recorded officers’ physical fitness (pft), rifle, 
and pistol scores are included to test whether the coefficients of focus variables stay 
stable. A match of single supervisors and married officers is used as the base case. Table 
22 presents these two model specifications. Other control variables are commissioning 
age, ethnicity group, tbs overall class rank percentile, commissioning source, 
commissioning fiscal year. 
Table 22.  POLS model specifications for Supervisor Favoritism 
Hypothesis 5 
Ho : PIsm=1, om=1 = PI sm=1, om=0 
HA : PI sm=1, om=1 > PI sm=1, om=0
1. PI = β0 + β1 (Married_to_Married) + β2 (Married_to_Single) + β3 
(Single_to_Single) + other control variables 
2. PI = β0 + β1 (Married_to_Married) + β2 (Married_to_Single) +                          
β3 (Single_to_Single) + β4 (pft score) + β5 (rifle score) +  β6 (pistol score) + 
other control variables 
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b. FE Model Specification  
For the FE estimations, the second model specification of the POLS 
models is utilized. In this model, besides the focus variables, pft,, rifle, and pistol scores 
also change over time. These scores are physical measures that are measured objectively. 
Therefore, the effect of supervisor favoritism is better captured by using additional time-
variant performance measures, which are immune to any bias related to supervisors. The 
model specification is presented below: 
 







Other control variables are commissioning age, ethnicity group, tbs overall 
class rank percentile, commissioning source, commissioning fiscal years. 
3. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
The expected magnitude and amount of the effects of matches of marital status of 
supervisors and recorded officers is unclear. Other controlled variables have the same 
hypothesized effects as mentioned in the PI model specification section. 
Table 24. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on PI  
Variable Group Variable Name Variable Description Expected Sign 




Matches of marital statuses of 





Comm._age Commissioning age + 
White White (base ethnicity group) 
Africaname African American - 
Hispanic Hispanic - 
Personal Characteristics 
Otherrace Other Race - 
Job-related 
characteristics 
Tbsperc TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 
+ 
Usna USNA (base comm. source) 
Nrotc NROTC + 
Plc PLC - 
Occ OCC - 
Mecep MECEP + 
Ecp ECP - 
Commissioning sources 
Mcp MCP - 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Year 
FY_80 – FY_99 Commissioning Fiscal Year + 
( )iit PIPI −  = β1(Married_to_Marriedit- Married_to_Marriedi) + 
β2(Married_to_Singleit - Married_to_Singlei) +β3(Single_to_Singleit-  
Single_to_Singlei) + β4(pft scoreit-  pft scorei) + β5(rifle score it-  rifle scorei) + 
β6(pistol scoreit-pistol score i) + other control variables  
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D. PROMOTION MODELS 
1. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 6 will answer the question whether there is a premium in the 
probability to promote in the most competitive promotion boards for married personnel. 
This hypothesis is that married male Marine officers are more likely to promote to the 
fourth and fifth grades. Hypothesis 6 is stated below where m represents the marital 
status of the officers. 
 
Hypothesis 7 will test the question whether more accumulated years in marriage 
increase the probability to promote for married men. This hypothesis is based on the 
same suggestions as Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 7 is that each additional year spent in 
marriage increases the probability to promote to the fourth and fifth grades. Hypothesis 7 
is stated below where m represents the marital status of marine officers and n represents 
the number of years spent in marriage. 
 
Hypothesis 8 will test the effect of having non-spousal dependents on the 
probability to promote. Again the same suggestions as for Hypothesis 3 are used to 
establish this hypothesis.  Hypothesis 8 is that having additional non-spousal dependents 
increases the probability to promote. Hypothesis 8 is stated below where n is the number 
of dependents that an officer has when he received the performance evaluation. 
 
Hypothesis 9 will address the question whether the promotion rates of married 
officers are different from those of officers who are not married but who will marry in the 
Hypothesis 6 
Ho : Prom m=1 = Prom m=0 
HA : Prom m=1> Prom m=0 
Hypothesis 7 
Ho: Prom m=1,n+1 = Prom m=1,n 
HA: Prom m=1,n+1 > Prom m=1,n 
Hypothesis 8 
Ho : Prom n+1 = Prom n 
HA : Prom n+1 > Prom n 
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future grades (to-be-married).  The ninth hypothesis is that married officers’ promotion 
probability is higher than “to-be-married” officers’ promotion probability, whose 
promotion probability is not different from “to-be-single” officers’. This hypothesis is 
presented below where s represents the current or the future marital status of the officer.  
 
 
2. Model Specification 
The promotion models use simple probit estimation. As discussed in the data 
chapter, promotions to the fourth and fifth grades are the most competitive selection 
processes in Marine officers’ career. Promotion models use specifications similar to the 
Performance Index models.  
 
Table 25. Probit Model Specifications for Promotion to O-4 and O-5. 
 
Other factors are ethnicity group, tbs overall class rank percentile , 
commissioning source. 
Due to the selection bias resulting from retention decisions, we benefited from a 
maximum likelihood probit estimation (MLPE) with sample selection. By doing so, we 
tried to control for the existing selection bias. Similar to the case for the PI samples, 
officers who made O-3 or O-4 but did not stay until the O-4 or O-5 promotion board 
made the sample a heterogeneous one that may create selection bias. Commissioning age, 
prior enlisted service, MOS groups, receiving recommendation for accelerated promotion 
and recommendation for no promotion, are included as instrumental variables that are 
correlated with survival but not with promotion. Table 26 exhibits model specifications 
for a maximum likelihood probit estimation with selection techniques.  
Differing from Heckman estimation model specifications, commissioning age is 
kept in the selection equation as an instrumental variable but is not included in the 
regression equation, since commissioning age is not a factor in promotion to O-4 or O-5 
Hypothesis 9 
Ho : Proms=married = Proms=to-be-married = Proms=to-be-single 
HA : Proms=married > Proms=to-be-married = Proms=to-be-single 
Prom (Oi) = β0 + β1 (Marital Status / Accumulated Married Years / 
Number of Dependents / Married vs. To-be-married) + other factors , i= 4,5 
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but is a factor in retention. Older commissioned officers may not want to leave the 
military and build a career in civilian life because of their age. On the other side, younger 
commissioned officers may prefer to leave early to build a career outside the military. 
Different MOS groups are also used as instrumental variables because there is a 
connection between MOS and retention. One particular MOS group may have better job 
opportunities in civilian life then others and this difference affects the retention decision. 
However, MOS should not affect promotion.   
Being “prior enlisted” is another instrumental variable and an indicator of taste for 
the military. Being prior enlisted may result in receiving better PIs in early periods, but 
then there will be no effect because the gap between prior enlisted and non-enlisted 
officers disappears. Therefore, we can accept that, generally, being prior enlisted is not 
related to receiving better PIs. On the other hand, it is a factor for retention. It is an 
indicator of taste and prior enlisted officers may establish stronger ties to the military 
than non prior enlisted officers. 
Table 26. Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimation with Selection Model Specifications for 
Promotion to O-4 and O-5  
 
 
Table 27 lists the explanatory variables and their hypothesized relationship to 
promotion outcomes. Different from the PI models, the effect of minority status on 
promotion probability is not clear. Similar to the PI models, the TBS class-rank percentile 
is expected to be positive. Quester and Hiatt (2001) state that “there is a very strong 
relationship between TBS rank and the probability of promotion to major, with those in 
the top third of their TBS classes having almost doubled the probability of promotion to 
Selection Equation 
 
1. P(si=1|z) = Ф(γ1, MOS groups + γ2, Prior Enlisted Service + γ3, 
Commissioning age + γ4, Recommendation for accelerated promotion +  γ5, 




2. Prom (Oi) = β0 + β1(Marital Status/ Married vs. To-be-married/ 
Accumulated Married Years / Number of Dependents) + other factors , 
i=4,5 
54 
major of those in the bottom third.” Enlisted commissioning programs that are related to 
prior enlisted officers are expected to affect the promotion probability positively for the 
fourth grade and negatively for O-5. North and Goldhaber (1995) hypothesize that since 
prior enlisted officers become eligible for retirement when they are up for the fifth grade 
promotion, promotion board members may be unwilling to take a chance on an officer 
who may retire after promotion. They also point out that eligibility for retirement may 
also affect prior enlisted officers’ motivation to work harder. From the literature, we 
expect that marital status at the promotion board, accumulated years in marriage, and the 
number of non-spousal dependents has a positive effect on both promotion outcomes.  
Table 27. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on PI. 
Expected Sign Variable Group Variable Name Variable Description 
O-4 O-5 
Hypothesis 6 Married_O3 
Married_O4 
Married (at O-3, O-4) +  + 
Hypothesis 7 accmaryears Additional Marriage Years + + 
Hypothesis 8 numkidsprev Number of Dependents at the 
previous rank 
+ + 
Marr_curr Currently Married + 
To-be-married Currently not married but will marry 
in the future 
? 
Hypothesis 9 
To-be-single Currently not married and will not 
marry in the future 
(base marital status) 
white White (base ethnicity group) 
africaname African American ? ? 
hispanic Hispanic ? ? 
Ethnic 
Characteristics 




tbsperc TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile + + 
usna USNA (base commissioning 
source) 
nrotc NROTC ? ? 
plc PLC ? ? 
occ OCC ? ? 
mecep MECEP + - 




mcp MCP + - 
 
E. RETENTION MODELS 
1. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 10 will answer the question whether married marine officers are more 
likely than their single counterparts to retain 10 years in service. This hypothesis is that 
male marine officers who are married at accession are more likely to retain ten years in 
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service than those who are not married at accession. Hypothesis 8 is stated below where 
m represents the marital status of officers. 
 
Hypothesis 11 will test the effect of having non-spousal dependents on the 
retention decision of Marine officers. The suggestion in this hypothesis is that having 
dependents other than a spouse increases the financial responsibility of marine officers 
and causes them to stay in the military. Thus, Hypothesis 11 is that having additional 
non-spousal dependents increases the probability to retain 10 years in service. Hypothesis 
11 is stated below: 
 
Hypothesis 12 will focus on the question whether the retention rates of married 
officers are different from those of officers who are not married but will marry in future 
grades (to-be-married).  This hypothesis is that married officers’ retention probability is 
higher than “to-be-married” officers’, whose retention probability is not different from 
“to-be-single” officers’. This hypothesis is presented below where s represents the current 








Ho : Retentionm=1 = Retention m=0 
HA : Retention m=1> Retention m=0 
Hypothesis 12 
Ho : Rets=married = Rets=to-be-married = Ret s= to-be-single 
HA : Rets=married > Rets=to-be-married = Rets=to-be-single
Hypothesis 11 
Ho : Retentionn+1 = Retention n 
HA : Retention n+1> Retention n 
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2. Model Specification 
The model specification for the retention estimates are based on the model used 
by Ergun (2002). The specification of the models according to three hypotheses is 
presented in Table 28. In the second model, besides job-related characteristics, 
commissioning sources, and job experience, PI in the first rank is also included to control 
for the Marine officer’s future success anticipation.  
Table 28. Simple Probit Regression Model Specifications for Retention Models 
 
 
Other factors are commissioning age, ethnicity group, gct score, tbs overall class 
rank percentile, prior enlisted service, commissioning source, and mos groups. 
3. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
Table 29 lists the explanatory variables and their hypothesized relationship to 
retention probability. Marital status at accession is expected to be positively related to 
retention. Prior enlistment status and enlisted commissioning programs are also expected 
to retain more, since enlistment background is also a sign of having a taste for military 
service. Under the assumption that shorter pre-commissioning military training leads to a 
lower taste for the military, Ergun (2002) estimates the negative effects of being PLC and 
OCC graduates on the retention decision. Since Hosek et. al (2001) find that black men 
are more likely to stay in the military voluntarily, the signs for being African American is 
expected to be positive relative to the base group, being white. However, the sign for 







Retained_10YCS =  β0 + β1 (Marital Status at accession / Number of 
Dependents at accession/ Married vs. To-be-married at accession) + other 
factors 
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Table 29. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on 10 Year Retention 
Variable Group Variable Name Variable Description Expected Sign 
Hypothesis 10 Married_acc 
 
Married at accession + (compared to 
not married) 
Hypothesis 11 numkidsprev Number of Dependents at 
accession 
+ 
Marr_curr Currently Married + 
To-be-married Currently not married but will 
marry in the future 
? 
Hypothesis 12 
To-be-single Currently not married and will 
not marry in the future 
(base marital status) 
Comm._age Commissioning age + 
White White (base ethnicity group) 
africaname African American + 
hispanic Hispanic ? 
Personal Characteristics 
otherrace Other Race ? 
Job-experience priorenl Prior Enlisted Service + 
Job-related 
characteristics 
tbsperc TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 
+ 
Cognitive ability f_gct First recorded GCT score ? 
Usna USNA (base comm. source) 
Nrotc NROTC ? 
Plc PLC - 
Occ OCC - 
mecep MECEP + 
Ecp ECP + 
Commissioning sources 
Mcp MCP + 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the model specifications according to three different 
performance indicators. PI models use OLS and FE regressions to analyze the marriage 
premium in PI scores. Both promotion and retention models use simple probit 
estimations. For the O-4 and O-5 PI estimations, the Heckman procedure is used, and for 
the promotion to O-4 and O-5 estimations, the maximum likelihood probit estimation 
(MLPE) with selection is used in order to have better coefficients that are corrected 
against possible effects of an expected selection bias emerging from the U.S. Marine 
Corps officers’ retention decision. The model specifications are based on the prior 
literature and the availability of the variables in the dataset. All models include marital 
status, accumulated years in marriage, number of non-spousal dependents, and to-be-
married status as the focus variables, except the retention model in which accumulated 




























This chapter contains results for each of the performance measures according to 
the appropriate modeling techniques. The results are presented in four main sections. The 
first section focuses on the marriage and dependency differentials in the performance 
indexes. In the second section, analyses of the effect of supervisor favoritism on 
performance evaluation are tested by looking at matches of the marital statuses of 
supervisors and their subordinates. The third section analyzes the premium of these focus 
variables on promotion probabilities to O-4 and O-5. Finally, the last section presents 
analyses of the effect of marital status and the number of non-spousal dependents on the 
10-year retention decisions of male marine officers. Each section begins with descriptive 
statistics of the sample used and continues with a presentation of the regression results. 
Besides the Panel OLS technique, PI models are estimated by fixed-effects to see if the 
premium is affected by unobservable individual characteristics. Since there is an expected 
selection bias that is supposed to emerge from the retention decisions of U.S. Marine 
Corps officers prior to O-4 and O-5, the models that are related to these ranks are also 
estimated by controlling for selectivity. PI estimations for O-4 and O-5, which have 
continuous dependent variables, are estimated by using the Heckman procedure. On the 
other hand, for the promotion models, which have dichotomous dependent variables, 
maximum likelihood probit estimators (MLPE) with selection technique is applied.   
A. PERFORMANCE INDEX MODEL ESTIMATES 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Sample means of the controlled variables according to the dichotomous focus 
variables in estimations are shown in the first four columns of Table 30. The last two 
columns consist of the correlations between continuous focus variables and other 
controlled variables in the models. Married officers are approximately 1 year older than 
single officers. White officers are the most dominant race group in the USMC officer 
corps, occupying 90 percent of the sample. Interestingly, divorced officers have the 
highest TBS class rank percentile, 57.3, in average.  Married and “to-be-married” officers 
follow divorced officers by 54.6 and 53.4 percentage points, respectively. Among the six 
commissioning sources, with a 40 percentage of the sample observations, PLC graduates 
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have the highest representation. In addition, MECEP and ECP graduates are more 
correlated with the number of children than other commissioning programs’ graduates.  
Table 30. Sample Means of the Variables in PI Model  
Variables Married Single Divorced  









Age 23.579 22.833 24.259 22.821 0.167 0.124 
White 0.897 0.882 0.901 0.889 0.010 0.030 
African American 0.049 0.052 0.045 0.046 0.006 -0.007 
Hispanic 0.032 0.034 0.037 0.033 -0.005 -0.012 
Other Race 0.022 0.033 0.017 0.031 -0.022 -0.035 
TBS Class 
Percentile 54.675 50.248 57.337 53.400 0.082 0.080 
GCT Score 128.659 128.302 128.844 128.680 0.033 0.018 
Commissioning 
Source-USNA 0.093 0.130 0.058 0.141 -0.031 -0.046 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 0.170 0.223 0.157 0.232 -0.049 -0.049 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 0.399 0.425 0.326 0.420 -0.065 -0.032 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 0.218 0.193 0.211 0.173 0.025 0.042 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 0.062 0.008 0.157 0.013 0.172 0.086 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 0.058 0.020 0.091 0.021 0.108 0.089 
 
2. Panel OLS (POLS) Estimates 
Table 31 presents coefficients, standard errors, and p-values from the POLS 
regressions on PI. OLS estimates for each rank are presented in Appendix A. Each model 
specification differs only in the focus variables in order to analyze the related hypothesis. 
The models explain 15-20 percent of the variation in the PI.  
Model 1 analyzes the PI premium related to the marital status. POLS regression 
results indicate that married officers receive a 0.7-point higher performance evaluation 
than single male marine officers. This result is significant at the 1-percent level. Although 




than that of married officers. This finding is consistent with the human capital 
accumulation hypothesis, which states that divorced officers may accumulate more 
human capital while they were married and thus they may perform better than officers 
who have not been married. 
Model 2 analyzes whether marriage has a dynamic productivity enhancing effect 
as in Kenny (1983), Korenmark and Neumark (1991), and Mehay and Bowman (2004). 
Estimates indicate that each additional year of marriage increases the performance 
evaluation grade by .35 points. This result supports both the household specialization and 
the human capital investment hypotheses. Officers who have spent more years in 
marriage are able to specialize more in military activities and may have more time or 
opportunity to invest in human capitals than their counterparts who have spent less time 
in marriage. 
Model 3 focuses on the effect of non-spousal dependents on PI. The model 
specification includes dummy marital status variables, the number of non-spousal 
dependents, and interactions of these focus variables. The result of the POLS regression 
shows that an officer’s PI increases as the number of his dependents increases. Each 
additional non-spousal dependent increases the performance evaluation score by 
approximately 1 point. Hill (1979) and Mehay and Bowman (2004) report similar results. 
Hill claims that having non-spousal dependents increases the responsibility of workers, 
which motivates them to earn more by increasing their productivity. However, interaction 
variables are negative. The effect of additional non-spousal dependents for married 
officers diminishes to 0.6 points for married officers and 0.4 points for divorced officers. 
Anderson and Krieg (2000) state that more dependents may cause married and divorced 
workers to spend more time doing household work and to specialize less in market work. 
Although this seems to explain the diminishing effect of additional children for married 
and divorced officers, it does not explain the higher effects of dependents for single 
officers. In all cases, non-spousal dependents have a significantly positive effect on PI. 
Model 4 focuses on the difference between married and “to-be-married” officers. 
“To-be-married” officers are single officers who will marry in the future. “To-be-single” 
officers are the baseline. As discussed in the models section, the analysis of the difference 
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between married and “to-be-married” officers helps to examine whether the marriage 
premium is due to unobservable characteristics of the officers that are correlated with 
both more successful performers and selection into marriage. In other words, it analyzes 
whether the marriage premium is uniquely related to marriage as Stratton (2002) claims. 
After separating single officers who are single and will stay single in the future from 
single officers who will marry in the future, the marriage premium for currently married 
officers increases by 1 points. This difference is significant at the 1% significance level. 
The premium for being a “to-be-married” officer is 0.8 points. The close results between 
married and “to-be-married” officers support the hypothesis that a substantial portion of 
the marriage premium can be explained by selectivity into marriage.   
The magnitude and the effect of control variables other than the focus variables 
are the same in all the models. Being non-white has a negative impact on the PI. 
Although GCT scores, which were used as a proxy for cognitive ability, were expected to 
have positive signs, the results show that officers with high GCT scores receive lower 
performance evaluation scores. The TBS overall class rank percentile has a positive sign. 
Similar to Ergun’s (2003) results, all commissioning sources have a negative effect on the 
PI when they are compared to USNA. 
Table 31. POLS Estimates of PI Models  
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
0.716 N/A 0.488 1.056 Married (20.41)*** N/A (12.96)*** (23.76)*** 
1.049 N/A 0.998 N/A Divorced (6.27)*** N/A (4.65)*** N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 0.832 To be married N/A N/A N/A (19.95)*** 
N/A 0.351 N/A N/A Accumulated Marriage 
Years N/A (65.33)*** N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 0.954 N/A Number of  Non-Spousal 
Dependents N/A N/A (20.72)*** N/A 
N/A N/A -0.355 N/A Married and have kids N/A N/A (6.93)*** N/A 
N/A N/A -0.550 N/A Divorced and have kids N/A N/A (3.59)*** N/A 
-0.072 -0.084 -0.094 -0.069 Commissioning Age (6.40)*** (7.70)*** (8.34)*** (6.21)*** 
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Table 31.    POLS Estimates of PI Models(Cont.) 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
African American -0.527 -0.593 -0.549 -0.627 
 (5.13)*** (5.48)*** (5.35)*** (5.75)*** 
Hispanic -0.171 -0.163 -0.201 -0.181 
 (1.78)* (1.69)* (2.11)** (1.87)* 
-0.233 -0.232 -0.243 -0.232 Other Race (2.30)** (2.28)** (2.42)** (2.31)** 
-0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 GCT Score (9.40)*** (9.34)*** (9.23)*** (9.70)*** 
0.033 0.033 0.032 0.033 TBS Class Percentile (45.95)*** (46.50)*** (45.04)*** (47.15)*** 
-0.190 -0.244 -0.199 -0.197 Commissioning Source-
NROTC (3.22)*** (4.08)*** (3.37)*** (3.31)*** 
-0.386 -0.424 -0.384 -0.346 Commissioning Source-
PLC (6.56)*** (7.28)*** (6.53)*** (5.95)*** 
-0.142 -0.226 -0.133 -0.129 Commissioning Source-
OCC (2.09)** (3.41)*** (1.96)** (1.93)* 
-0.336 -0.298 -0.608 -0.238 Commissioning Source-
MECEP (3.54)*** (3.20)*** (6.16)*** (2.47)** 
-0.374 -0.451 -0.483 -0.337 Commissioning Source-
ECP (3.41)*** (3.96)*** (4.42)*** (2.90)*** 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Year YES YES YES YES 
98.506 98.076 98.513 97.713 Constant (252.54)*** (261.40)*** (253.08)*** (257.76)*** 
Observations 46861 51935 46671 52255 
F-stat 253.79 91.22 256.06 355.34 
R-squared 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.17 
Note 1: Robust t statistics in parntheses 
Note 2: * signifiant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 32 presents the fixed-effects estimation results of the same models shown in 
Table 31 and tests the same hypotheses. This method is widely used in the literature on 
the marriage premium to test selectivity into marriage by eliminating the effects of 
unobservable, individual-specific factors that correlate with high wages and cause a bias 
in the marriage dummy coefficient.  
Interestingly, FE estimates of PI models yield higher coefficients for all the focus 
variables. For the first model, the coefficients double. Apparently, observed and 
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unobserved individual characteristics that are omitted from the POLS estimations cause a 
downward bias in Table 31. The effect of accumulated years in marriage remains 
approximately the same with the POLS results. In the third model, the number of non-
spousal dependents is found to have a higher impact on PI in the FE estimates. In the 
fourth model, the effect of being a “to-be-married” officer increase from 0.8 points to 1 
point, and the effect of being married decreases by 21 percent to 0.8 points after the effect 
of individual-specific characteristics are eliminated.  This result reinforces the claim that 
the marriage premium is explained in fact by selectivity into marriage. Different from 
POLS results, marital status variables have higher coefficients, and interaction terms have 
lower negative impacts. Thus, married and divorced officers with dependents receive 
higher performance evaluations than their single counterparts who have the same number 
of dependents. 
Table 32. FE Estimates of PI Models  
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
Variables Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
1.478 N/A 1.245 0.789 Married 
(25.40)*** N/A (21.08)*** (21.16)*** 
2.237 N/A 1.810 N/A Divorced 
(8.71)*** N/A (5.85)*** N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 1.039 To be married 
N/A N/A N/A (24.45)*** 
N/A 0.364 N/A N/A Accumulated 
Marriage Years N/A (50.29)*** N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 1.201 N/A Number of  
Non-spousal 
Dependents 
N/A N/A (18.61)*** N/A 
N/A N/A -0.159 N/A Married and 
have kids N/A N/A (2.29)** N/A 
N/A N/A -0.0/85 N/A Divorced and 
have kids N/A N/A (0.32) N/A 
97.231 97.155 96.991 97.048 Constant 
(3445.26)*** (5920.02)*** (3330.60)*** (3395.94)*** 
Observations 46861 51935 46671 54033 
Number of ssn1 19626 19932 19604 19625 
F-stat 355.14 565.97 316.42 344.38 
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.01 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 




3. Heckman Estimates 
Table 33 presents the results of the Heckman procedure for the PI  O-4 outcomes. 
In these estimates, the longitudinal form of the panel data is used. In all of the four model 
specifications, inverse mills ratios (λ) are significant, which indicates that there is a 
sample selection problem due to people leaving prior to the O-4 promotion board. PI 
OLS estimates for O-4 with the Heckman procedure help to reduce this sample selection 
bias. The first model tests the first hypothesis, controlling for selection bias which 
diminishes the marriage premium to 0.1 points for grade O-4. The premium for being 
divorced turns out to be insignificant. Similarly, the premium for each additional year in 
marriage decreases to .005 points. The estimate is insignificant. Also, the effect of having 
an additional dependent is diminished in selection-corrected results. On the other hand, 
approximately half of the premium for married and for 80-percent of the “to-be-married” 
officers, according to their association with “to-be-single” officers, remains significant. 
After controlling for sample selection in the fourth hypothesis, although all marital status 
and interaction terms are insignificant, the number of dependents still has a significant 
positive effect on PI as on O-4.  
Table 33. Heckman Estimates of PI Models for O-4 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
Variables Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
0.103 N/A 0.064 0.416 Married at O-3 
(1.87)* N/A (0.99) (6.39)*** 
0.035 N/A 0.004 N/A Divorced at O-3 
(0.17) N/A (0.01) N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 0.646 To be married      at O-
4 N/A N/A N/A (7.73)*** 
N/A 0.005 N/A N/A Accumulated Marriage 
Years  at O-4 N/A (0.84) N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 0.172 N/A Number of Non-
Spousal Dependents at 
O-4 
N/A N/A (3.16)*** N/A 
N/A N/A -0.071 N/A Married and have kids 
at O-4 N/A N/A (1.17) N/A 
N/A N/A -0.017 N/A Divorced and have 
kids at O-4 N/A N/A (0.07) N/A 
-0.056 -0.053 -0.062 -0.055 Commissioning Age 
(3.21)*** (3.04)*** (3.56)*** (3.20)*** 
-0.142 -0.077 -0.132 -0.082 African American 
(1.02) (0.55) (0.95) (0.59) 
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Table 33.    Heckman Estimates of PI Models for O-4 (Cont.) 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
Variables Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
Hispanic 0.305 0.385 0.280 0.383 
 (1.61) (2.00)** (1.47) (2.00)** 
Other Race 0.206 0.034 0.206 0.050 
 (1.08) (0.19) (1.08) (0.27) 
TBS Class 
Percentile 
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (1.71)* (1.11) (1.43) (0.76) 
Commissioning 
Source-ROTC 
-0.122 -0.137 -0.112 -0.118 
 (1.25) (1.39) (1.15) (1.20) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.084 -0.120 -0.067 -0.059 
 (0.96) (1.36) (0.77) (0.66) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
0.092 0.023 0.114 0.084 
 (0.87) (0.22) (1.07) (0.80) 
Hispanic 0.305 0.385 0.280 0.383 
 (1.61) (2.00)** (1.47) (2.00)** 
-0.156 -0.243 -0.195 -0.235 Commissioning 
Source-MECEP (0.83) (1.26) (1.03) (1.21) 
-0.312 -0.365 -0.322 -0.331 
(1.96)* (2.27)** (2.02)** (2.05)** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
(0.93) (0.91) (1.11) (0.81) 
Commissioning 
Fiscal Year YES YES YES YES 
-.430 -.721 -.476 -.769 Lambda (λ) 
(.237)* (.280)*** (.237)** (.279)*** 
100.797 101.074 100.878 100.805 Constant 
(192.89)*** (180.68)*** (192.18)*** (179.94)*** 
Observations 10013 10276 10013 10252 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Inverse mills ratios in all of the model specifications in the Heckman procedure 
for the PI outcomes at O-5 are insignificant. Thus, for O-5 there is no bias due to sample 
selection. Ergun (2003) does not analyze the determinants of the PI for O-5. His rationale 
is that performance in O-5 is inflated by supervisors. Grade inflation may also be caused 
by the fact that officers who performed well in their previous grades are selected as O-5s. 
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Heckman results including selection equation coefficient estimates for O-4 and O-5 are 
presented in Appendix B.  
Note that coefficients of variables in the OLS regression results range from -1 to 
+3. Since they are measured on a scale from 0 to 100, although the estimated effects of 
the focus variables are statistically significant, they seem to be economically 
insignificant. Before reaching a conclusive judgment, one should take into account that 
the dependent variable, PI, is right-skewed and the variation is very low, since almost all 
of the officers received grades above 90. 
B. SUPERVISOR FAVORITISM MODEL ESTIMATES 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
The supervisor favoritism model utilizes a different sample that includes direct 
observations on the supervisors’ marital status. As discussed in the third chapter, the 
focus variables are formed by matching the marital status of recorded officers and that of 
reporting seniors. Table 34 presents the sample means for the control variables by each 
focus variable. The distribution of the variables is similar to that of the panel data utilized 
for the PI models in the previous section. 
Table 34. Sample means by marital matching in supervisor favoritism sample 
Variables Married2Married Single2Single Married2Single Single2Married
PI 98.612 98.447 98.592 98.346 
Commissioning 
Age  24.421 22.885 22.928 24.235 
White 0.874 0.880 0.879 0.856 
African American 0.052 0.047 0.050 0.058 
Hispanic 0.045 0.040 0.037 0.050 
Other Race 0.029 0.034 0.034 0.036 
TBS Class 
Percentile 56.641 50.559 50.755 55.421 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 0.142 0.251 0.243 0.164 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 0.380 0.398 0.411 0.399 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 0.220 0.193 0.184 0.233 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 0.124 0.010 0.011 0.100 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 0.084 0.019 0.019 0.066 
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2. Panel OLS (POLS) Estimates 
Table 35 presents the results of POLS and FE estimates for the supervisor 
favoritism models. Model 1 focuses on the association between the marital statuses of 
recording seniors and these of their subordinates who received the performance 
evaluations, by controlling the same variables used in the first section, except the first 
GCR score. This model can only explain 7 percent of the variation in the PI. According to 
these results, married supervisors give slightly better fitreps to married officers than to  
single officers. On the other hand, single supervisors give single officers much higher 
fitreps than married reporting seniors. In the second model, recorded officers’ rifle, pistol, 
and pft scores are included and the r-square of the model is improved to 12 percent. 
These new control variables are used as a proxy for physical ability for job performance, 
which may change over time. After adding these variables, the impact of the marital 
matching variables are not affected. The new coefficients of new variables are significant 
at the 0.01 level. The Pft score has the highest impact on the PI when compared to pistol 
and rifle scores. One unexpected result is that the rifle score has a negative sign. 
However, the most striking result is that, after controlling for individual-specific 
characteristics of the reporting officers by using the FE method, supervisor favoritism 
turns out to be “supervisor unfavoritism” for married officers by married supervisors. 
Married supervisors evaluate their single subordinates better than their married ones. The 
difference is 0.19 points in favor of single officers at a 1 percent significance level. Thus, 
these result rules out the possibility that the robust marriage premium found in the PI in 
the previous section is due to supervisor favoritism.  
Table 35. POLS and FE estimates for Supervisor Favoritism Models in PI 
 Model-1 (POLS) Model-2 (POLS) Model-3 (FE) 
Variables PI PI PI 
0.425 0.347 -0.195 Married to Married  
(6.48)*** (5.29)*** (2.70)*** 
0.264 0.292 0.056 Single to Single 
(4.29)*** (4.71)*** (1.55) 
0.409 0.331 N/A Married to Single 
(7.19)*** (5.84)*** N/A 
N/A -0.001 N/A Rifle Scores 
N/A (8.72)*** N/A 
N/A 0.001 0.001 Pistol Scores 
N/A (6.23)*** (5.86)*** 
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Table 35.  POLS and FE estimates for Supervisor Favoritism Models in PI (Cont.) 
 Model-1 (POLS) Model-2 (POLS) Model-3 (FE) 
Variables PI PI PI 
Physical Fitness  
Test Scores 
N/A 0.007 0.006 
 N/A (35.06)*** (32.95)*** 
Commissioning Age -0.021 -0.032 N/A 
 (2.03)** (3.03)*** N/A 
African American -0.431 -0.460 N/A 
 (4.10)*** (4.04)*** N/A 
-0.124 -0.079 N/A Hispanic 
(1.41) (0.85) N/A 
-0.122 -0.096 N/A Other Race 
(1.46) (1.11) N/A 
0.027 0.026 N/A TBS Class Percentile 
(42.93)*** (40.10)*** N/A 
-0.040 -0.035 N/A Commissioning Source-
ROTC (0.80) (0.68) N/A 
0.042 -0.096 N/A Commissioning Source-
PLC (0.86) (1.91)* N/A 
-0.133 -0.163 N/A Commissioning Source-
OCC (2.35)** (2.77)*** N/A 
-0.057 -0.527 N/A Commissioning Source-
MEEP (0.64) (5.60)*** N/A 
-0.240 -0.615 N/A 
(2.39)** (5.90)*** N/A 
Commissioning Source-
ECP 
(2.56)** (2.51)** N/A 
Commissioning  
Fiscal Year YES YES YES 
Constant 96.492 95.557 97.115 
 (167.07)*** (174.98)*** (3360.27)***
Observations 74346 67433 67433 
F-stat 261.87 345.67 411.78 
R-squared 0.08 0.14 0.07 
Number of officers 14771 14771 14771 
Note 1: Robust t statistics in parentheses 










C. PROMOTION TO O-4 MODEL ESTIMATES 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 36 presents sample means of control variables used in the O-4 promotion 
model. According to these statistics, married and single officers who survive until the O-
4 promotion board are quite similar in their commissioning age. White officers are the 
majority of the race group at approximately 90 percent. The single officers have the 
highest TBS class rank percentile with 58.92, and married officers follow them with 
56.84. Interestingly, a majority of the divorced officers are PLC graduates.  
Table 36. Sample Means by Focus Variables in O-4 Promotion Model  









Age 23.466 23.857 22.641 23.099 23.106 22.642 
White 0.915 0.929 0.903 0.912 0.913 0.905 
African 
American 0.043 0.033 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.038 
Hispanic 0.025 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.027 
Other Race 0.018 0.016 0.030 0.023 0.023 0.030 
TBS Class 
Percentile 56.841 58.920 53.386 55.296 55.877 55.476 
GCT Score 129.209 129.593 129.232 129.294 129.319 129.323 
Commissioning 
Source-USNA 0.093 0.077 0.124 0.106 0.108 0.134 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 0.180 0.159 0.240 0.204 0.203 0.248 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 0.392 0.365 0.454 0.413 0.402 0.431 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 0.207 0.170 0.150 0.192 0.201 0.150 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 0.063 0.124 0.012 0.039 0.038 0.014 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 0.065 0.104 0.021 0.045 0.046 0.023 
 
2. Simple Probit Estimates 
Table 37   presents simple probit estimates of promotion to the O-4 model. There 
are four different model specifications in which we test the four different hypotheses 
mentioned in Chapter 4. In this section, we discuss the estimation results of the focus 
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variables and the control variables in four different models. The model specifications are 
identical except for the focus variables.      
In the first model, Hypothesis 6 is tested to determine whether there is a premium 
related to being married in the promotion board outcome. Different from the PI model 
specification, divorced officers are included in the unmarried officer group, since we 
focus on the effect of being married or not being married at the promotion board. Simple 
probit regression results for the first model indicate that being married has a positive and 
highly significant effect at the .01 level on promotion to O-4. Moreover, married officers 
have 0.031 (3.6%) more promotion probability than unmarried officers                       
(including both single and divorced officers).  
In the second model, the seventh hypothesis is tested to determine whether 
accumulated years of marriage has an effect on O-4 promotion. Simple probit regression 
results for the second model indicate that each additional year in marriage provides 0.002 
(0.23%) higher promotion probabilities at a 5 percent significance level.  
In the third model, the results reveal that the promotion probability of male U.S. 
Marine Corps officers to O-4 is 0.052 (6%) higher for each additional non-spousal 
dependent. This result is highly significant and consistent with what Hill (1979) and 
Mehay and Bowman (2004) report in their studies. Both draw attention to the positive 
effect of having non-spousal dependents.  
The fourth model focuses on the difference between married and “to-be-married” 
officers. The estimation results of this model reveal that “to-be-married” officers have 
higher O-4 promotion rates (significant at a .01 level) when compared to “to-be-single” 
officers. More specifically, married officers have a 0.035 (3.97%) higher promotion 
probability than unmarried ones, and “to-be-married” officers have a 0.076 (8.87%) 
higher promotion probability then the base case, “to-be-single” officers.       
In all four models the control variables are significant. They are TBS overall class 
rank percentiles and no promote recommendation status. This result is consistent with 
Ergun’s (2003) results. TBS class rank percentiles have a positive effect on O-4 
promotion in each model. Other significant variables are accelerated promotion 
recommendation status, NROTC, PLC, MECEP, and ECP. Another remarkable result is 
72 
the insignificant results associated with the race variables. It seems that there is no 
significant difference among promotion rates of different races. This result undermines 
concerns about racism and discrimination in the military.      
Table 37. Probit Models of Promotion to O- 4  
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-
3 
Variables Hypothesis-6 Hypothesis-7 Hypothesis-8 Hypothesis-9 
Married at O-3 0.132 N/A N/A 0.148 
 (3.76)*** N/A N/A (4.15)*** 
 [0.031] N/A N/A [0. 034] 
Accumulated 
Marriage Years At 
O-4 
N/A 0.009 N/A N/A 
 N/A (2.37)** N/A N/A 
 N/A [0.002] N/A N/A 
Number of Non-
Spousal 
dependents at O-4 
N/A N/A 0.231 N/A 
 N/A N/A (11.56)*** N/A 
 N/A N/A [0.052] N/A 
To be married  
at O-3 
N/A N/A N/A 0.366 
 N/A N/A N/A (9.19)*** 
 N/A N/A N/A [0. 076] 
African American -0.045 -0.041 -0.052 -0.044 
 (0.56) (0.51) (0.64) (0.54) 
Hispanic -0.114 -0.109 -0.129 -0.133 
 (1.11) (1.06) (1.24) (1.28) 
Other Race -0.041 -0.042 -0.016 -0.071 
 (0.38) (0.39) (0.15) (0.65) 
TBS Class 
Percentile 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (8.46)*** (8.55)*** (8.19)*** (8.22)*** 




0.265 0.267 0.177 0.285 
 (1.83)* (1.85)* (1.19) (1.95)* 
 [0.053] [0.053]  [0. 056] 
Receiving NO 
Promotion 
-0.667 -0.664 -0.631 -0.653 
 (2.20)** (2.19)** (2.07)** (2.14)** 




Table 37. Probit Models of Promotion to O- 4 (Cont.) 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-3 
Variables Hypothesis-6 Hypothesis-7 Hypothesis-8 Hypothesis-9 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.106 -0.108 -0.103 -0.101 
 (1.68)* (1.71)* (1.62) (1.59) 
 [-0.205] [-0.026]   
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.104 -0.109 -0.112 -0.090 
 (1.81)* (1.91)* (1.93)* (1.56) 
 [-0.204] [-0.025] [-0. 025]  
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
0.066 0.063 0.037 0.098 
 (1.01) (0.96) (0.56) (1.49) 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.018 -0.026 -0.211 0.063 
 (0.17) (0.25) (1.98)** (0.59) 
   [-0. 052]  
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
0.142 0.128 0.025 0.209 
 (1.37) (1.24) (0.24) (2.01)** 
Rho (ρ) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
 (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** 
     
Constant 0.719 0.757 0.691 0.604 
 (10.92)*** (11.62)*** (10.87)*** (8.97)*** 
Observations 8587 8644 8644 8587 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note 3: Numbers in brackets indicate marginal effects 
 
3. MLPE with Selection Estimates  
Table 38 presents maximum-likelihood probit estimates (MLPE) with selection 
results of promotion to O-4. The MLPE results, including selection equation coefficient 
estimates for O-4, are presented in Appendix C. The four hypotheses are tested again 
with four different models as in the simple probit section. In fact, retention decisions of 
U.S. Marine Corps officers influence the estimation results with simple probit after O-4. 
The retention decision is the main cause for sample selection bias due to non-random 
selection into staying in service till O-4.   
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The probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 1981) 
assumes that there exists an underlying relationship between the probit equation and the 
selection equation, such that we observe only the binary outcome. The dependent 
variable, however, is not always observed. It is observed when the dependent variable of 
the selection equation is observed. And the term rho (ρ) is supposed to equal the 
correlation between the error terms of two equations. Whenever ρ ≠ 0, then probit applied 
to the first equation yields unbiased results. MLPE provides consistent, asymptotically 
efficient estimates for all the parameters in such models.  
MLPE results in Table 39. for the first model indicate that being married has a 
positive and highly significant effect on promotion to O-4. The sixth hypothesis is tested 
and married officers are found to have 0.033 (4%) higher promotion probabilities than 
unmarried ones (including both single and divorced men).  
In the second model, the seventh hypothesis is tested to determine whether 
marriage has a dynamic productivity enhancing structure as claimed by Kenny (1983), 
Korenmark and Neumark (1991), and Mehay and Bowman (2004), after controlling for 
selection bias arising from retention. MLPE results for the second model indicate that 
each additional year in marriage provides a 0.023 (2.78%) higher promotion probability.  
In the third model, the results reveal that each additional non-spousal dependent 
increases the promotion probabilities of male U.S. Marine Corps officers by 0.056 
(6.63%). This result is highly significant and consistent with what Hill (1979) and Mehay 
and Bowman (2004) report in their studies.  
The fourth model focuses on the difference between married and “to-be-married” 
officers. The estimation results of this model reveal that “to-be-married” officers have a 
0.09 (10.69%) higher O-4 promotion probability then “to-be-single” officers. The 
coefficient for married is 0.038 (4.51%). 
In all four models the same control variables are observed to have significant 
estimation results. Similar to Ergun’s (2003) results, TBS class rank percentiles have a 
positive effect on O-4 promotion in each model. On the  other  hand,  in  different models 
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NROTC and ECP graduates are found to be significant, too. Similar to the results with 
the simple probit model, race is insignificant. This result reveals that there is no 
difference among promotion rates of different races, even after controlling for selection 
bias. 
Overall, we can say that controlling for selection bias does not result in any major 
difference from the simple probit estimates. On the other hand, the rho (ρ) term is 
significant and positive in all models, which shows that there is an upward bias in single 
probit estimations. 
Table 38. MLPE with Selection results of promotion to O-4 models  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables  Hypothesis 6  Hypothesis 7 Hypothesis 8 Hypothesis 9 
Married at O-3 0.129 N/A N/A 0.143 
 (3.94)*** N/A N/A (4.31)*** 
 [0.339] N/A N/A [0.038] 
Accumulated 
Marriage Years At 
O-4 
N/A 0.009 N/A N/A 
 N/A (2.47)** N/A N/A 
 N/A [0.023] N/A N/A 
Number of Non-
Spousal 
dependents at O-4 
N/A N/A 0.218 N/A 
 N/A N/A (11.08)*** N/A 
 N/A N/A [0.056] N/A 
To be married       
at O-3 
N/A N/A N/A 0.341 
 N/A N/A N/A (8.86)*** 
 N/A N/A N/A [0.090] 
African American -0.081 -0.076 -0.089 -0.080 
 (1.05) (0.99) (1.16) (1.04) 
Hispanic -0.119 -0.115 -0.134 -0.137 
 (1.22) (1.18) (1.37) (1.40) 
Other Race -0.047 -0.048 -0.025 -0.074 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.25) (0.72) 
TBS Class 
Percentile 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (10.75)*** (10.68)*** (10.77)*** (10.70)*** 





Table 38. MLPE with Selection results of promotion to O-4 models (Cont.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables  Hypothesis 6  Hypothesis 7 Hypothesis 8 Hypothesis 9 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.101 -0.102 -0.095 -0.097 
 (1.69)* (1.70)* (1.57) (1.61) 
 [-0.032] [-0.032]   
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.112 -0.116 -0.116 -0.098 
 (2.05)** (2.11)** (2.13)** (1.79)* 
 [-0.210] [-0.210] [-0.022] [-0.018] 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
0.016 0.017 -0.013 0.043 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.20) (0.68) 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
0.136 0.124 -0.027 0.219 
 (1.26) (1.15) (0.25) (2.04)** 
    [0.036] 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
0.197 0.184 0.094 0.262 
 (1.98)** (1.85)* (0.94) (2.64)*** 
 [0.060] [0.056]  [0.073] 
Constant 0.297 0.348 0.231 0.172 
 (2.63)*** (3.04)*** (2.13)** (1.57) 
Observations 14116 14170 14170 14116 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parenthes 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note 3: Numbers in brackets indicate marginal effects 
 
D. PROMOTION TO O-5 MODEL ESTIMATES 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 39 presents sample means of variables used in promotion to O-5 models. 
These statistics yield similar results with the one computed for O-4. According to these 
statistics, married and single officers who survive until the O-5 board are similar in 
commissioning age. White officers are 93 percent of the race group. However, in this 
sample, married officers have the highest TBS class rank percentile with 60.386,  
compared to single officers with a 59.622 average. PLC is again the most common 





Table 39. Sample Means by Focus Variables in O-5 Promotion Model 
Variable Married Single Divorced To_be_married Numkidsprev Accmaryear
Commissioning 
Age 23.252 23.248 22.681 22.626 23.064 23.040 
White 0.946 0.924 0.929 0.928 0.942 0.942 
African American 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.026 0.031 0.031 
Hispanic 0.016 0.034 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.014 
Other Race 0.008 0.008 0.026 0.030 0.013 0.013 
TBS Class 
Percentile 60.386 59.622 58.741 59.877 59.702 59.878 
GCT Score 129.530 130.103 130.011 130.272 129.770 129.813 
Commissioning 
Source-USNA 0.094 0.093 0.134 0.136 0.107 0.108 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 0.169 0.161 0.186 0.189 0.176 0.178 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 0.360 0.390 0.396 0.391 0.372 0.371 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 0.284 0.203 0.256 0.252 0.273 0.272 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 0.029 0.076 0.001 0.007 0.020 0.020 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 0.065 0.076 0.027 0.024 0.052 0.051 
 
2. Simple Probit Estimates 
Table 40 presents simple probit estimates of promotion to the O-5 model. There 
are four different model specifications in which we test the four different hypotheses. In 
this section we discuss the estimation results of the focus variables and the control 
variables in four different models.  
In the first model Hypothesis 6 is tested to determine whether there is any 
potential premium related to being married in the O-5 promotion board outcome. Simple 
probit regression results for the first model indicate that being married has a positive and 
significant effect on promotion to O-5, at the .05 level. Furthermore, married officers 
have a 0.068 (10.05%) higher promotion probability than unmarried officers.  
The second model tests Hypothesis 7 to determine whether the number of 
marriage years has any effect on promotion to O-5, or not. However, simple probit 
regression results for the second model do not reveal any significant result associated 
with this focus variable.  
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In the third model, the results reveal that the promotion probabilities of male U.S. 
Marine Corps officers to O-5 increase by 0.076 (10.90%) with each additional non-
spousal dependent. This result is highly significant and is consistent with what Hill 
(1979) and Mehay and Bowman (2004) report in their studies.  
The fourth model tests Hypothesis 9 and focuses on the difference between 
married and “to-be-married” officers. The estimation results of this model reveal that  
“to-be-married” officers have a 0.08 (11.83%) higher O-5 promotion probability then the 
“to-be-single” officers. The coefficient for the married officers is found to be 0.064 
(9.46%) in the same model. 
In all four models, four control variables are significant at traditional significance 
levels. They are TBS class rank percentiles, OCC, MECEP, and ECP commissioning 
sources. There are insignificant results associated with the race variables. It seems that 
there is no significant difference in different races for promotion rates, and the concerns 
about racism and discrimination in the military are not realistic.         
Table 40. Probit Models of Promotion to O-5  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Hypothesis 6 Hypothesis 7 Hypothesis 8 Hypothesis 9 
Married at O-3 0.184 N/A N/A 0.174 
 (1.93)* N/A N/A (1.81)* 
 [0. 068] N/A N/A [0. 064] 
Accumulated 
Marriage Years At 
O-4 
N/A -0.003 N/A N/A 
 N/A (0.46) N/A N/A 
Number of Non-
Spousal 
dependents at O-4 
N/A N/A 0.216 N/A 
 N/A N/A (7.62)*** N/A 
 N/A N/A [0. 076] N/A 
To be married  
at O-3 
N/A N/A N/A 0.231 
 N/A N/A N/A (2.87)*** 







Table 40 Probit Models of Promotion to O-5 (Cont.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Hypothesis 6 Hypothesis 7 Hypothesis 8 Hypothesis 9 
African American 0.171 0.061 0.107 0.180 
 (0.92) (0.34) (0.59) (0.97) 
Hispanic 0.379 0.232 0.179 0.373 
 (1.35) (0.86) (0.66) (1.33) 
Other Race -0.168 -0.183 -0.126 -0.226 
 (0.62) (0.68) (0.46) (0.83) 
TBS Class 
Percentile 
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 




0.303 0.289 0.229 0.299 
 (1.99)** (1.92)* (1.50) (1.96)** 
 [0. 101] [0. 094] [-0. 095] [0. 100] 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.018 -0.023 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.07) (0.01) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.159 -0.161 -0.157 -0.136 
 (1.38) (1.44) (1.39) (1.17) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.220 -0.244 -0.264 -0.189 
 (1.86)* (2.13)** (2.27)** (1.59) 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.844 -0.855 -1.007 -0.786 
 (3.67)*** (3.73)*** (4.33)*** (3.40)*** 
 [-0.326] [-0. 330] [-0. 385] [-0. 305] 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.464 -0.499 -0.581 -0.413 
 (2.76)*** (3.02)*** (3.50)*** (2.44)** 
 [-0.178] [-0. 190] [-0. 221] [-0.158] 
Constant 0.115 0.382 0.049 0.060 
 (0.76) (2.84)*** (0.37) (0.39) 
Observations 1692 1828 1828 1692 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





3. MLPE with Selection Estimates  
Table 41 presents maximum-likelihood probit estimates (MLPE) results of 
promotion to O-5. The MLPE results, including selection equation coefficient estimates 
for O-5, are presented in Appendix C. Due to the expected selection bias and in order to 
find more realistic results, MLPE with selection is preferred.  
In the first model, Hypothesis 6 is tested and the test results reveal a slightly 
significant premium related to being married in O-5. MLPE results for the first model 
indicate that being married has a positive but slightly significant effect at the .10 level on 
promotion to O-5. Married officers are found to have a 0.076 (12.37%) higher promotion 
probability than the unmarried officers.  
MLPE results for the second model do not reveal any significant result associated 
with the focus variable. Non-spousal dependents’ effect on promotion to O-5 is tested 
with the third model. The estimate results reveal that the promotion probabilities of male 
U.S. Marine Corps officers to O-5 increase by 0.067 (11.94%) with each additional non-
spousal dependent. This result is highly significant at the .05 level and is consistent with 
prior literature about the effect of non-spousal dependents.  
The fourth model MLPE results reveal that “to-be-married” officers have a 0.08 
(12%) higher O-5 promotion probability than the “to-be-single” officers.  
The model specifications used in all four models are similar. TBS class rank 
percentiles, accelerated promotion recommendation, commissioning sources of OCC, and 
MECEP are the significant variables observed in all four models. The basic school class 
rank percentages have a positive effect on O-4 promotion in each model. There is no 
significant difference in different races for promotion rates.  
Overall, we can say that controlling for selection bias does not result in any major 
difference from the simple probit estimates for O-5 promotion models. To the contrary, 
simple probit estimates have more significant results than MLPE results. Nevertheless, 







Table 41. MLPE with Selection Results of Promotion to O-5 Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Hypothesis 6 Hypothesis 7 Hypothesis 8 Hypothesis 9 
Married at O-4 0.085 N/A N/A 0.072 
 (2.07)** N/A N/A (1.72)* 
 [0.076] N/A N/A [0.062] 
Accumulated 
Marriage Years  
At O-5 
N/A 0.001 N/A N/A 
 N/A (0.27) N/A N/A 
Number of Non-
Spousal Dependents 
at  O-5 
N/A N/A 0.082 N/A 
 N/A N/A (6.10)*** N/A 
 N/A N/A [0.067] N/A 
To be married at O-4 N/A N/A N/A 0.056 
 N/A N/A N/A (1.97)** 
 N/A N/A N/A [0.048] 
African American 0.032 -0.023 0.001 0.030 
 (0.31) (0.22) (0.01) (0.29) 
Hispanic 0.172 0.107 0.076 0.171 
 (1.11) (0.69) (0.49) (1.11) 
Other Race -0.042 -0.046 -0.021 -0.056 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.13) (0.33) 
TBS Class Percentile 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 
 (13.16)*** (13.16)*** (13.07)*** (13.00)*** 




0.679 0.661 0.634 0.680 
 (6.27)*** (6.19)*** (5.92)*** (6.17)*** 
 [0.116] [0.116] [0.104] [0.123] 
Receiving NO-
Promotion 
-5.211 -8.190 -8.410 -7.886 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.025 -0.015 -0.005 -0.021 
 (0.33) (0.20) (0.06) (0.28) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.108 -0.095 -0.087 -0.103 
 (1.58) (1.43) (1.30) (1.50) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC  
-0.136 -0.137 -0.140 -0.128 
 (1.93)* (1.99)** (2.02)** (1.81)* 
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Table 41.   MLPE with Selection Results of Promotion to O-5 Model (Cont.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Hypothesis 6 Hypothesis 7 Hypothesis 8 Hypothesis 9 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.655 -0.686 -0.733 -0.638 
 (4.33)*** (4.55)*** (4.84)*** (4.20)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.103 -0.127 -0.151 -0.087 
 (0.92) (1.15) (1.36) (0.78) 
Constant -1.345 -1.204 -1.328 -1.348 
 (16.11)*** (15.78)*** (17.52)*** (12.37)*** 
Observations 5436 5563 5563 5436 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note 3: Numbers in brackets indicate marginal effects 
 
E. 10-YEAR RETENTION MODEL ESTIMATES 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 42 presents the sample means of control variables by marital status. Single 
officers are approximately 1 year younger than married officers and 2 years younger than 
divorced officers at commissioning. Interestingly, divorced officers have higher TBS 
class rank percentiles. Approximately 96 percent of the divorced officers are white and 
approximately half of the single officers are PLC graduates. Aviation MOS are the most 
dominant MOS group among the married officers and single officers who will marry in 
the future. Among single officers, Combat MOS are the most common MOS group. 
Table 42. Sample Means by Marital Status for 10 Year Retention Sample 
  Married_acc Divorced_acc Single_acc To_be_married
Commissioning 
Age 23.563 24.701 22.635 22.788 
White 0.910 0.962 0.895 0.90 
African 
American 0.049 0.013 0.049 0.042 
Hispanic 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 
Other Race 0.016 0.001 0.029 0.029 
GCT Score 29.109 130.893 128.864 128.659 
TBS Class 
Percentile 53.520 58.252 49.404 53.023 





Table 42 Sample Means by Marital Status for 10 Year Retention Sample 
(Cont.) 
  Married_acc Divorced_acc Single_acc To_be_married
 
Commissioning 
Source-USNA 0.081 0.037 0.117 0.137 
Commissioning 
Source-
NROTC 0.157 0.152 0.225 0.244 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 0.394 0.304 0.458 0.456 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 0.23 0.228 0.172 0.133 
Commissioning 
Source-
MECEP 0.063 0.139 0.007 0.011 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 0.069 0.139 0.020 0.019 
Combat MOS 0.283 0.291 0.373 0.335 
Group Support 
MOS 0.202 0.139 0.161 0.146 
Service MOS 0.131 0.165 0.101 0.097 
Aviation MOS 0.308 0.203 0.298 0.362 
Aviation 
Support MOS 0.096 0.228 0.080 0.071 
 
2. Simple Probit Estimates 
The coefficients, standard errors, and marginal effects of the variables in the 
simple probit estimation of the 10-year retention models are shown in Table 43. The first 
model presents the effect of marital status at accession on the likelihood to retain. Being 
married increases the probability to retain by 0.077 (13.41%) when compared to being 
single, all else equal. Being divorced also has a positive sign, but it is not statistically 
significant. The second model analyzes the effect of each non-spousal dependent at the 
accession point on the retention decision of officers. Results indicate that each additional 
non-spousal dependent increases the retention probability by 0.054 (9.4%), all else equal. 
In the third model, single officers who will marry later in their careers have a 0.418 
(72.82%) higher probability to retain 10 years in service than single officers who will 
stay single in the future. Officers who are married at accession also have a 0.309 
(53.83%) higher retention probability than “to-be-single” officers. In other words, 
married officers and single officers who will marry are more likely to retain than officers 
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who do not plan to get married. All focus variables, except being divorced, are significant 
at a 1-percent significance level. These results are consistent with Kol and Ryu’s (2002) 
retention estimations in which they report that the premium in the likelihood to retain 
until the O-4 for married male navy officers is 9 percentage points higher for URL and 19 
percentage points higher for the STF/RL officers.  
The coefficients of all other control variables have similar effects on retention. 
Each additional year of age at commissioning increases the retention probability by 
approximately 0.02 (3.3%), all else equal. As expected, being prior enlisted increases the 
retention probability as compared to officers who are not prior enlisted. All MOS groups, 
except the aviation MOS group, have negative effects on retention when compared to 
combat MOS group. Belonging to PLC and OCC commissioning sources affects 
retention probability negatively when compared to the USNA. The effect of the MECEP 
commissioning source is positive. Graduates of this commissioning program have 0.383 
(66.7%) higher retention rates than USNA graduates.  
Table 43. Probit Models of 10 Year Retention 
Variables Model-1 Model 2 Model 3 
Married at Accession  0.197 N/A 0.827 
 (7.42)*** N/A (25.49)*** 
 [0.077] N/A [0.309] 
Divorced at 
Accession 
0.216 N/A N/A 




N/A 0.137 N/A 
 N/A (4.93)*** N/A 
 N/A [0.054] N/A 
To be married at O-1 N/A N/A 1.183 
 N/A N/A (35.41)*** 
 N/A N/A [0.418] 
Commissioning Age 0.049 0.052 0.045 
 (5.39)*** (5.66)*** (4.80)*** 
African American 0.020 0.010 0.019 
 (0.32) (0.15) (0.29) 
Hispanic 0.027 0.023 0.003 




Table 43.    Probit Models of 10 Year Retention (Cont.) 
Variables Model-1 Model 2 Model 3 
Other Race -0.003 -0.001 -0.029 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.33) 
GCT Score -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
 (3.70)*** (3.60)*** (2.15)** 
TBS Class Percentile 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (10.30)*** (10.56)*** (7.86)*** 
Prior Enlisted 0.240 0.226 0.187 
 (3.83)*** (3.56)*** (2.87)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC  
-0.003 -0.015 0.039 
 (0.06) (0.32) (0.83) 
Commissioning 
Source- PLC 
-0.107 -0.108 -0.019 
 (2.48)** (2.45)** (0.42) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.282 -0.271 -0.127 
 (5.56)*** (5.26)*** (2.40)** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
0.383 0.408 0.529 
 (3.38)*** (3.55)*** (4.58)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
0.049 0.066 0.245 
 (0.49) (0.64) (2.36)** 
Group Support MOS -0.084 -0.071 -0.113 
 (2.38)** (1.99)** (3.07)*** 
Service Support 
MOS 
-0.146 -0.122 -0.204 
 (3.47)*** (2.84)*** (4.64)*** 
Aviation MOS 0.461 0.467 0.367 
 (14.66)*** (14.80)*** (11.24)*** 
Aviation Support 
MOS 
-0.097 -0.085 -0.098 
 (2.11)** (1.84)* (2.05)** 
Constant -0.670 -0.702 -1.455 
 (2.40)** (2.49)** (5.02)*** 
Observations 11028 10853 11028 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parenthese 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented multivariate regression results of four different 
performance measures: performance indexes, supervisor favoritism, promotion to O-4/  
O-5, and retention. Four different hypotheses are tested with different models by using 
panel OLS, fixed effects, and the Heckman estimating techniques. Overall, in order to 
better interpret the estimation results of simple probit and MLPE of each variable in these 
models, marginal effects of these variables are also computed.   
For the PI models, panel OLS results indicate significant and positive results for 
all focus variables. However, divorced officers are predicted to have more PIs then 
singles and being both married and divorced together with non-spousal dependents 
yielded negative effects on PIs. Fixed effect estimates for PIs generated higher 
coefficients for all focus variables. On the other hand, the Heckman estimates in O-4 PI 
produced a lower marriage premium. Heckman estimation results, which include 
selection equation estimates, are presented in Appendix B. For the O-5, Heckman 
estimations do not indicate any selection bias. 
The results of panel OLS for the test of supervisor favoritism revealed that 
married supervisors give slightly better fitreps to married officers than single officers. 
But single supervisors are found to give higher fitreps to single officers than to married 
officers. Surprisingly, FE estimates revealed that single officers receive better fitreps 
from married supervisors than do married officers. Thus we reject the hypothesis that the 
marriage premium, which is found to be robust in the PI models, is caused by supervisor 
favoritism.  
Both promotion to O-4 and O-5 models produced similar results with simple 
probit and MLPE techniques. For O-4 all four focus variables were significant and had 
positive effects in both the simple probit and MLPE with sample selection estimates. 
However, for the O-5, second hypothesis is found to be insignificant. Accumulated 
marriage years have no significant effect on promotion to O-5 both in simple probit and 




The 10-YCS retention model is estimated with simple probit. Being married is 
found to have a significant and positive effect on retention of 10 YCS. In addition,          
“to-be-married” officers are found to be more likely to stay than “to-be-single” men. The 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study sheds light primarily on the effect of marital status and number of non-
spousal dependents as effective factors on performance and on-the-job productivity of 
U.S. Marine Corps officers. In addition to those two factors, the effect of personal 
characteristics, job related characteristics, and commissioning sources are also analyzed 
in this study. Mainly, four performance measures are used as a proxy for performance 
and on-the-job productivity: performance indexes (PIs), promotion to O-4, promotion to 
O-5, and 10 years retention. Simple probit, panel OLS, fixed effect, Heckman, and 
maximum likelihood probit estimators with selection techniques are used in this study.  
Simple T-test statistics reveal that male USMC officers receive higher evaluation 
scores from their supervisors, have more 10-year retention rates, and have more 
promotion rates to O-4 and O-5.  
The analysis of the effect of marital status reveals that married officers have an 
approximately 1 point higher PI score, a 4-12 percentage point higher promotion 
probability, and 13 percentage points retention probability than single marine officers. 
Additionally, each additional year spent in marriage increases PI scores by .35 points and 
retention probability by 3 percentage points. Besides, having an additional non-spousal 
dependent increases performance evaluation scores by .4–1 points, promotion probability 
by 6-12 percentage points, and retention probability by 10 percentage points. On the 
other hand, “to-be-married” officers have the same or a higher premium as married 
officers for all productivity and performance indicators. This last finding supports the 
selectivity into marriage hypothesis as an explanation of the source of the marriage 







Table 44. Summary of the Results by Partial Effects of the Focus Variables 










POLS 0.716*** 1.049*** 0.832*** 0.351*** 0.954*** 
PI 
 
FE 1.478*** 2.237*** 1.039*** 0.364*** 1.201*** 
PI (O-4) 
 





0.031*** N/A 0.076*** 0.002** 0.052*** 
Promotion 
to O-4 





0.068* N/A 0. 080*** -0.006 0.076*** 
Promotion 
to O-5 





0.077*** 0.086 0.418*** N/A 0.054*** 
Note 1: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The supervisor favoritism test reveals that married supervisors give married 
officers approximately the same evaluation scores they give single officers, while single 
supervisors give higher scores to single officers than to married officers. These results 
reject supervisor favoritism as an explanation for the marriage premium found in the PI 
scores of USMC officers.      
The study finds that married male officers in U.S. Marine Corps are more 
productive and perform better than single male officers. Also, marriage is found to have a 
dynamic effect on productivity. It is also estimated that each additional non-spousal 
dependent increases performance and on-the-job productivity. The premium associated 
with marriage and family remains robust even after eliminating individual-specific 
characteristics. The test based on matching supervisors and their subordinates reveals that 
supervisor favoritism does not explain the marriage premium. However, the test of the 
differences among married, “to-be-married”, and “to-be-single” men shows that a 
significant portion of the marriage premium is due to selectivity into marriage, which is 
the choice of more productive officers to marry, and unobservable factors correlated with 
both marriage and performance. 
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The robust effect of marriage and non-spousal dependents on performance, on-
the-job productivity, and retention, provides a rationale for continuing military policies 
that provide benefits to married personnel. In the USMC, these policies are conducted 
under the name of Quality of Life (QOL) programs. The main QOL programs include the 
Child Care Program, Exceptional Family Member Program, Marriage Enrichment 
Program, Family Member Employment Program, and Youth and Teen Program. 
However, this study shows that a significant portion of the marriage premium is caused 
by selection into marriage by better-performing officers. Thus, the U.S. Marine Corps 
may benefit by conducting a full cost-benefit analysis of these programs.  
The main drawback of the study is the lack of generalizability of data on marine 
officers to the civilian population. Another limitation is the lack of exact marriage dates. 
When performance in one particular rank is based on the marital status in a previous rank, 
it is assumed to represent the last marital status before promoting to that rank. Also, “the 
accumulated years of marriage” variable is calculated by assuming that the marriage 
event occurs in the middle of a given rank. Exact dates of marriage would provide a more 
precise estimate of the dynamic effect of marriage.  
The dataset does not include any information on spouses. Spouses’ labor market 
participation, work hours, and education level are found to be important in the prior 
literature. In addition, a survey of hours spent in household production by single and 
married male officers would be beneficial to understand the importance of household 
specialization theories for the explanation of USMC officers’ marriage premium. 
Finally, the data does not provide ages of non-spousal dependents. When 
analyzing the effect of dependents on productivity, such additional information will 
provide more precision and better understanding of the differentials caused by changes in 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
93 
APPENDIX A. OLS ESTIMATES OF PI MODELS BY RANKS 
Table 45. OLS Estimates of O-1 PI Models 
 Model-1 Model-3 Model-4 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
Married 0.181 0.201 0.481 
 (2.82)*** (3.04)*** (6.88)*** 
Divorced 0.029 -0.196 N/A 
 (0.08) (0.45) N/A 
Number of non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A -0.086 N/A 
 N/A (0.28) N/A 
Married and have non-
spousal dependents 
N/A -0.018 N/A 
 N/A (0.06) N/A 
Divorced and have 
non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A 0.492 N/A 
 N/A (0.85) N/A 
To be Married N/A N/A 0.659 
 N/A N/A (10.25)*** 
Commissioning age -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.28) (0.01) (0.54) 
African American -0.645 -0.651 -0.650 
 (5.32)*** (5.31)*** (5.38)*** 
Hispanic -0.232 -0.215 -0.243 
 (1.62) (1.50) (1.70)* 
Other Race -0.403 -0.412 -0.384 
 (2.52)** (2.56)** (2.41)** 
Gct Score -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
 (5.05)*** (4.83)*** (4.92)*** 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.041 0.041 0.040 
 (39.96)*** (39.53)*** (39.15)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.350 -0.349 -0.319 
 (3.44)*** (3.38)*** (3.15)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.164 -0.175 -0.133 
 (1.74)* (1.83)* (1.41) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.052 -0.052 0.010 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.10) 
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Table 45.    OLS Estimates of O-1 PI Models (Cont.) 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.419 -0.388 -0.350 
 (2.28)** (2.07)** (1.91)* 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.415 -0.430 -0.343 
 (2.43)** (2.48)** (2.01)** 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Year 
YES YES YES 
Constant 95.441 95.322 95.234 
 (165.21)*** (163.78)*** (165.27)*** 
Observations 19971 19732 19971 
F-stat 178.04 160.28 182.48 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.22 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 46. OLS Estimates of O-2 PI Models  
 Model-1 Model-3 Model-4 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
Married 0.190 0.178 0.658 
 (3.81)*** (3.38)*** (12.59)*** 
Divorced 0.343 0.299 N/A 
 (0.85) (0.56) N/A 
Number of non-
spousal dependents 
N/A 0.467 N/A 
 N/A (5.74)*** N/A 
Married and have 
non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A -0.346 N/A 
 N/A (3.78)*** N/A 
Divorced and have 
non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A -0.309 N/A 
 N/A (0.74) N/A 
To be Married N/A N/A 1.053 
 N/A N/A (16.50)*** 
Commissioning age -0.053 -0.059 -0.047 
 (3.34)*** (3.67)*** (3.13)*** 
African American -0.676 -0.686 -0.895 
 (6.16)*** (6.26)*** (8.43)*** 
Hispanic -0.131 -0.131 -0.145 
 (1.07) (1.07) (1.14) 
Other Race -0.307 -0.309 -0.286 
 (2.26)** (2.28)** (2.05)** 
Gct Score -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 
 (5.81)*** (5.66)*** (6.63)*** 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.025 0.024 0.029 
 (26.73)*** (26.48)*** (33.53)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.203 -0.210 -0.265 
 (2.26)** (2.34)** (3.06)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.418 -0.415 -0.347 
 (4.93)*** (4.90)*** (4.31)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.172 -0.170 -0.195 
 (1.73)* (1.71)* (2.12)** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.109 -0.194 -0.083 
 (0.66) (1.15) (0.52) 
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Table 46.    OLS Estimates of O-2 PI Models (Cont.) 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.225 -0.254 -0.304 
 (1.38) (1.55) (2.03)** 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Year 
YES YES YES 
Constant 93.598 97.666 96.866 
 (98.27)*** (50.22)*** (195.45)*** 
Observations 12457 12456 17894 
F-stat 134.04 121.93 227.75 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.26 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 47. OLS Estimates of O-3 PI Models 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
Married 0.168 N/A 0.130 0.565 
 (3.58)*** N/A (2.49)** (10.28)*** 
Divorced 0.212 N/A 0.201 N/A 
 (1.06) N/A (0.86) N/A 
Accumulated 
Years in Marriage 
N/A 0.064 N/A N/A 




N/A N/A 0.396 N/A 
 N/A N/A (6.48)*** N/A 
To Be Married N/A N/A  0.850 
 N/A N/A  (13.66)*** 
Married and have 
non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A N/A -0.248 N/A 




N/A N/A -0.256 N/A 
 N/A N/A (1.22) N/A 
Commissioning 
age 
-0.081 -0.082 -0.089 -0.080 
 (5.44)*** (5.47)*** (5.89)*** (5.42)*** 
African American -0.136 -0.111 -0.152 -0.144 
 (1.21) (0.96) (1.35) (1.28) 
Hispanic 0.006 0.040 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.04) (0.29) (0.04) (0.01) 
Other Race -0.100 -0.096 -0.105 -0.104 
 (0.72) (0.66) (0.75) (0.75) 
Gct Score -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 (4.54)*** (4.54)*** (4.46)*** (4.48)*** 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018 
 (20.67)*** (21.89)*** (20.37)*** (20.09)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
0.056 -0.005 0.054 0.064 
 (0.66) (0.06) (0.63) (0.76) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.240 -0.338 -0.235 -0.229 
 (3.03)*** (4.27)*** (2.98)*** (2.92)*** 
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Table 47.  OLS Estimates of O-3 PI Models (Cont.) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.174 -0.306 -0.169 -0.150 
 (1.91)* (3.37)*** (1.85)* (1.66)* 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
0.134 0.003 0.043 0.157 
 (0.86) (0.02) (0.27) (1.02) 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.195 -0.287 -0.229 -0.171 
 (1.26) (1.89)* (1.48) (1.11) 
Commissioning 
Fiscal Year 
YES YES YES YES 
Constant 98.398 99.696 98.442 98.061 
 (137.93)*** (201.12)*** (137.97)*** (138.30)*** 
Observations 13768 14220 13767 13767 
F-stat 72.94 82.71 67.87 80.77 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 48. OLS Estimates of O-4 PI Models 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
Married 0.062 N/A 0.034 0.190 
 (1.61) N/A (0.77) (4.07)*** 
Divorced 0.124 N/A 0.093 N/A 
 (0.97) N/A (0.56) N/A 
Accumulated Years in 
Marriage 
N/A 0.003 N/A N/A 
 N/A (0.62) N/A N/A 
Number of non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A N/A 0.118 N/A 
 N/A N/A (2.74)*** N/A 
To Be Married N/A N/A  0.335 
 N/A N/A  (5.41)*** 
Married and have non-
spousal dependents 
N/A N/A -0.053 N/A 
 N/A N/A (1.14) N/A 
Divorced and have non-
spousal dependents 
N/A N/A -0.028 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.20) N/A 
Commissioning age -0.030 -0.025 -0.034 -0.029 
 (2.56)** (2.16)** (2.90)*** (2.53)** 
African American -0.101 -0.079 -0.103 -0.089 
 (1.11) (0.87) (1.13) (0.98) 
Hispanic 0.135 0.155 0.125 0.140 
 (1.17) (1.35) (1.09) (1.22) 
Other Race 0.076 -0.032 0.074 0.062 
 (0.65) (0.28) (0.63) (0.53) 
Gct Score -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.14) (1.06) (1.06) (0.87) 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (4.89)*** (5.60)*** (4.75)*** (4.93)*** 
Commissioning Source-
NROTC 
-0.102 -0.112 -0.099 -0.103 
 (1.58) (1.73)* (1.54) (1.60) 
Commissioning Source-
PLC 
-0.108 -0.124 -0.101 -0.093 
 (1.77)* (2.03)** (1.65)* (1.52) 
Commissioning Source-
OCC 
-0.018 -0.075 -0.010 -0.019 




Table 48.    OLS Estimates of O-4 PI Models (Cont.) 
Commissioning Source-
MECEP 
0.016 -0.001 -0.007 0.038 
 (0.14) (0.01) (0.06) (0.34) 
Commissioning Source-
ECP 
-0.182 -0.183 -0.189 -0.138 
 (1.67)* (1.70)* (1.73)* (1.28) 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Year 
YES YES YES YES 
Constant 100.258 100.144 100.264 100.028 
 (265.29)*** (268.43)*** (264.67)*** (264.46)*** 
Observations 6741 7020 6741 6863 
F-Stat 6.77 7.47 6.66 8.34 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 49. OLS Estimates of O-4 PI Models 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
Married 0.060 N/A 0.064 0.099 
 (2.89)*** N/A (2.51)** (4.15)*** 
Divorced 0.014 N/A 0.015 N/A 
 (0.37) N/A (0.26) N/A 
Accumulated Years in 
Marriage 
N/A 0.003 N/A N/A 
 N/A (1.14) N/A N/A 
Number of non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A N/A 0.010 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.41) N/A 
To Be Married N/A N/A  0.090 
 N/A N/A  (2.68)*** 
Married and have non-
spousal dependents 
N/A N/A -0.010 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.39) N/A 
Divorced and have non-
spousal dependents 
N/A N/A -0.008 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.20) N/A 
Commissioning age -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.10) (0.68) (0.10) (0.11) 
African American -0.023 0.001 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.70) (0.01) (0.69) (0.71) 
Hispanic 0.013 0.032 0.013 0.013 
 (0.31) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32) 
Other Race 0.018 0.049 0.017 0.008 
 (0.36) (0.45) (0.34) (0.16) 
Gct Score 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.07) 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.33) (0.08) (1.33) (1.26) 
Commissioning Source-
NROTC 
0.001 -0.006 0.002 0.003 
 (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) 
Commissioning Source-
PLC 
-0.005 0.010 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.18) 
Commissioning Source-
OCC 
0.011 -0.044 0.011 0.009 




Table 49.    OLS Estimates of O-4 PI Models (Cont.) 
Commissioning Source-
MECEP 
0.008 0.038 0.008 0.009 
 (0.17) (0.35) (0.16) (0.18) 
Commissioning Source-
ECP 
-0.038 -0.008 -0.038 -0.041 
 (1.16) (0.11) (1.17) (1.24) 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Year 
YES YES YES YES 
Constant 99.906 99.992 99.902 99.857 
 (803.61)*** (371.56)*** (799.81)*** (799.22)*** 
Observations 1095 1192 1095 1095 
F-stat  1.38 1.12 1.17 1.83 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX B. HECKMAN ESTIMATES OF O-4 AND O-5 PI 
MODELS 
Table 50. Heckman Estimates of O-4 PI Models  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 




Married at O-3 0.103 N/A 0.064 N/A 
 (1.87)* N/A (0.99) N/A 
Divorced at O-3 0.035 N/A 0.004 N/A 
 (0.17) N/A (0.01) N/A 
Number of non-
spousal dependents at 
O-4 
N/A N/A 0.172 N/A 
 N/A N/A (3.16)*** N/A 
To Be Married at O-4 N/A N/A  N/A 
 N/A N/A  N/A 
Married and have 
non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A N/A -0.071 N/A 
 N/A N/A (1.17) N/A 
Divorced and have 
non-spousal 
dependents 
N/A N/A -0.017 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.07) N/A 
Commissioning age -0.056 0.030 -0.062 0.030 
 (3.21)*** (3.25)*** (3.56)*** (3.25)*** 
African American -0.142 -0.115 -0.132 -0.115 
 (1.02) (1.80)* (0.95) (1.80)* 
Hispanic 0.305 -0.161 0.280 -0.161 
 (1.61) (1.87)* (1.47) (1.87)* 
Other race 0.206 -0.171 0.206 -0.171 
 (1.09) (1.94)* (1.09) (1.94)* 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.003 0.009 0.002 0.009 
 (1.71)* (18.83)*** (1.43) (18.83)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.122 -0.010 -0.112 -0.010 










-0.084 -0.040 -0.067 -0.040 
 (0.96) (0.86) (0.77) (0.86) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
0.092 -0.170 0.114 -0.170 
 (0.87) (3.25)*** (1.07) (3.25)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.156 0.459 -0.194 0.459 
 (0.83) (3.57)*** (1.03) (3.57)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.312 0.243 -0.322 0.243 
 (1.96)* (2.29)** (2.02)** (2.29)** 
Commissioning 
Fiscal Years 
YES NO YES NO 
Prior Enlisted Service N/A 0.009 N/A 0.009 
 N/A (0.13) N/A (0.13) 
GCT score N/A -0.005 N/A -0.005 
 N/A (3.62)*** N/A (3.62)*** 
Ground Support MOS N/A -0.065 N/A -0.065 
 N/A (1.44) N/A (1.44) 
Combat MOS N/A -0.034 N/A -0.034 
 N/A (0.80) N/A (0.80) 
Aviation MOS N/A 0.301 N/A 0.301 
 N/A (6.89)*** N/A (6.89)*** 
Aviation Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.147 N/A -0.147 
 N/A (2.76)*** N/A (2.76)*** 
Lambda (λ) -.430 N/A -.721 N/A 
 (.237)* N/A (.280)*** N/A 
Constant 100.799 -0.601 100.879 -0.601 
 (192.79)*** (2.06)** (192.09)*** (2.06)** 















Table 50.    Heckman Estimates of O-4 PI Models (Cont.) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 




Married at O-3 N/A N/A 0.415 N/A 
 N/A N/A (6.39)*** N/A 
To Be Married at O-4 N/A N/A 0.646 N/A 
 N/A N/A (7.73)*** N/A 
Accumulated years of 
marriage until O-4 
0.005 N/A N/A N/A 
 (0.83) N/A N/A N/A 
Commissioning age -0.053 0.027 -0.055 0.027 
 (3.04)*** (2.97)*** (3.20)*** (2.95)*** 
African American -0.078 -0.134 -0.083 -0.131 
 (0.56) (2.13)** (0.60) (2.09)** 
Hispanic 0.383 -0.195 0.381 -0.192 
 (1.99)** (2.28)** (1.99)** (2.24)** 
Other race 0.033 -0.154 0.049 -0.151 
 (0.18) (1.80)* (0.26) (1.76)* 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.002 0.009 0.001 0.009 
 (1.16) (18.17)*** (0.80) (18.16)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.137 0.001 -0.119 -0.001 
 (1.40) (0.02) (1.21) (0.03) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.120 0.001 -0.059 -0.002 
 (1.36) (0.02) (0.66) (0.04) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
0.022 -0.118 0.084 -0.120 
 (0.21) (2.28)** (0.80) (2.33)** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.240 0.434 -0.231 0.435 
 (1.24) (3.41)*** (1.19) (3.41)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.362 0.261 -0.328 0.260 
 (2.26)** (2.51)** (2.04)** (2.50)** 
Commissioning 
Fiscal Years 
YES NO  YES NO 
Prior Enlisted Service N/A 0.043 N/A 0.039 
 N/A (0.64) N/A (0.58) 
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Table 50.    Heckman Estimates of O-4 PI Models (Cont.) 
GCT score N/A -0.005 N/A -0.005 
 N/A (3.43)*** N/A (3.51)*** 
Ground Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.063 N/A -0.062 
 N/A (1.40) N/A (1.40) 
Combat MOS N/A -0.027 N/A -0.026 
 N/A (0.66) N/A (0.63) 
Aviation MOS N/A 0.255 N/A 0.257 
 N/A (5.92)*** N/A (5.94)*** 
Aviation Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.114 N/A -0.118 
 N/A (2.21)** N/A (2.28)** 
Lambda (λ) -.476 N/A -.769 N/A 
 (.237)** N/A (.279)*** N/A 
Constant 101.059 -0.537 100.790 -0.520 
 (180.52)*** (1.88)* (179.81)*** (1.82)* 
Observations 10276 10276 10252 10252 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 51.  Heckman Estimates of O-5 PI Models  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 




Married at O-4 0.153 N/A 0.207 N/A 
 (2.58)** N/A (3.02)*** N/A 
Divorced at O-4 0.043 N/A N/A N/A 
 (0.32) N/A N/A N/A 
To Be Married at O-5 N/A N/A 0.159 N/A 
 N/A N/A (1.49) N/A 
Commissioning age 0.003 -0.035 0.005 -0.035 
 (0.22) (1.60) (0.39) (1.60) 
African American -0.142 -0.200 -0.129 -0.200 
 (1.18) (1.10) (1.10) (1.10) 
Hispanic 0.048 -0.120 0.049 -0.120 
 (0.31) (0.45) (0.32) (0.45) 
Other race -0.003 0.148 -0.003 0.148 
 (0.02) (0.63) (0.02) (0.63) 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010 
 (0.22) (8.70)*** (0.11) (8.70)*** 
Commissioning Source-
NROTC 
0.013 -0.060 0.019 -0.060 
 (0.21) (0.54) (0.31) (0.54) 
Commissioning Source-
PLC 
-0.003 -0.222 0.004 -0.222 
 (0.05) (2.17)** (0.07) (2.17)** 
Commissioning Source-
OCC 
0.043 -0.271 0.042 -0.271 
 (0.51) (2.37)** (0.51) (2.37)** 
Commissioning Source-
MECEP 
0.191 -0.678 0.189 -0.678 
 (1.15) (2.17)** (1.14) (2.17)** 
Commissioning Source-
ECP 
-0.084 0.021 -0.084 0.021 
 (0.86) (0.08) (0.86) (0.08) 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Years 
YES NO YES NO 
Prior Enlisted Service N/A 0.255 N/A 0.255 
 N/A (1.08) N/A (1.08) 
GCT score N/A -0.007 N/A -0.007 
 N/A (2.16)** N/A (2.16)** 
Ground Support MOS N/A -0.212 N/A -0.212 
 N/A (1.85)* N/A (1.85)* 
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Table 51.    Heckman Estimates of O-5 PI Models (Cont.) 
Combat MOS N/A -0.019 N/A -0.019 
 N/A (0.19) N/A (0.19) 
Aviation MOS N/A -0.033 N/A -0.033 
 N/A (0.32) N/A (0.32) 
Aviation Support MOS N/A -0.021 N/A -0.021 
 N/A (0.15) N/A (0.15) 
Lambda (λ) -.047 N/A -.072 N/A 
 (.231) N/A (.232) N/A 
Constant 99.816 -0.010 99.769 -0.010 
 (203.71)*** (0.01) (203.29)*** (0.01) 
Observations 3979 3979 3979 3979 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 51.    Heckman Estimates of O-5 PI Models (Cont.) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 




Married at O-4 N/A N/A 0.172 N/A 
 N/A N/A (2.26)** N/A 
Divorced at O-4 N/A N/A 0.159 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.70) N/A 
Number of non-spousal 
dependents at O-5 
N/A N/A 0.027 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.41) N/A 
Married and have non-
spousal dependents at  
O-5 
N/A N/A -0.030 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.43) N/A 
Divorced and have non-
spousal dependents at  
O-5 
N/A N/A -0.090 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.70) N/A 
Accumulated years of 
marriage until O-5 
0.004 N/A N/A N/A 
 (0.67) N/A N/A N/A 
Commissioning age -0.011 -0.035 0.003 -0.035 
 (0.39) (1.67)* (0.23) (1.60) 
African American -0.123 -0.287 -0.150 -0.200 





Table 51.    Heckman Estimates of O-5 PI Models (Cont.) 
Hispanic 0.132 -0.219 0.050 -0.120 
 (0.36) (0.84) (0.32) (0.45) 
Other race 0.106 0.064 -0.003 0.148 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.02) (0.63) 
TBS Class-rank 
percentile 
-0.002 0.010 0.001 0.010 
 (0.51) (9.21)*** (0.21) (8.70)*** 
Commissioning Source-
NROTC 
-0.008 -0.046 0.015 -0.060 
 (0.07) (0.44) (0.26) (0.54) 
Commissioning Source-
PLC 
0.080 -0.203 0.001 -0.222 
 (0.59) (2.10)** (0.01) (2.17)** 
Commissioning Source-
OCC 
-0.101 -0.258 0.044 -0.271 
 (0.59) (2.39)** (0.53) (2.37)** 
Commissioning Source-
MECEP 
0.413 -0.660 0.200 -0.678 
 (1.06) (2.13)** (1.20) (2.17)** 
Commissioning Source-
ECP 
-0.035 0.041 -0.084 0.021 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.86) (0.08) 
Commissioning Fiscal 
Years 
YES NO YES NO 
Prior Enlisted Service  0.152  0.255 
  (0.65)  (1.08) 
GCT score  -0.006  -0.007 
  (2.02)**  (2.16)** 
Ground Support MOS  -0.270  -0.212 
  (2.54)**  (1.85)* 
Combat MOS  -0.159  -0.019 
  (1.67)*  (0.19) 
Aviation MOS  -0.080  -0.033 
  (0.85)  (0.32) 
Aviation Support MOS  -0.079  -0.021 
  (0.62)  (0.15) 
Lambda (λ) -.266  -.052  
 (.499)  (.233)  
Constant 100.640 0.049 99.808 -0.010 
 (105.24)*** (0.08) (203.52)*** (0.01) 
Observations 4047 4047 3979 3979 
Note 1: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
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APPENDIX C. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD PROBIT ESTIMATION 
(MLPE) WITH SAMPLE SELECTION RESULTS 
Table 52. MLPE with Sample Selection Estimates of Promotion to O-4 Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
 prom_o4 survived_o4brd prom_o4 survived_o4brd 
Married at O-3 0.129 N/A N/A N/A 
 (3.94)*** N/A N/A N/A 
Accumulated years 
in marriage until 
O-4 board  
N/A N/A 0.009 N/A 
 N/A N/A (2.47)** N/A 
African American -0.081 -0.035 -0.076 -0.034 
 (1.05) (0.67) (0.99) (0.67) 
Hispanic -0.119 -0.033 -0.115 -0.037 
 (1.22) (0.48) (1.18) (0.55) 
Other race -0.047 -0.009 -0.048 -0.014 
 (0.46) (0.13) (0.47) (0.20) 
TBS Class Rank 
Percentile 
0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 (10.75)*** (13.54)*** (10.68)*** (13.55)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.101 0.054 -0.102 0.055 
 (1.69)* (1.30) (1.70)* (1.32) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.112 -0.064 -0.116 -0.062 
 (2.05)** (1.70)* (2.11)** (1.64) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
0.016 -0.286 0.017 -0.282 
 (0.26) (6.51)*** (0.27) (6.44)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
0.136 0.351 0.124 0.356 
 (1.26) (3.37)*** (1.15) (3.42)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
0.197 -0.076 0.184 -0.070 
 (1.98)** (0.87) (1.85)* (0.81) 
Commissioning 
Age 
N/A 0.045 N/A 0.045 




N/A 0.535 N/A 0.536 
 N/A (4.88)*** N/A (4.89)*** 
112 
Table 52. MLPE with Sample Selection Estimates of Promotion to O-4 Models (cont.) 
Not Recommended 
for promotion 
N/A -0.931 N/A -0.941 
 N/A (6.36)*** N/A (6.41)*** 
Prior Enlisted 
Service 
N/A 0.267 N/A 0.266 
 N/A (4.95)*** N/A (4.93)*** 
Ground Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.028 N/A -0.031 
 N/A (0.89) N/A (1.00) 
Combat MOS N/A -0.023 N/A -0.028 
 N/A (0.63) N/A (0.76) 
Aviation MOS N/A 0.376 N/A 0.371 
 N/A (13.76)*** N/A (13.55)*** 
Aviation Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.140 N/A -0.141 
 N/A (3.54)*** N/A (3.57)*** 
Constant 0.297 -1.086 0.348 -1.087 
 (2.63)*** (6.23)*** (3.04)*** (6.25)*** 
Observations 14116 14116 14170 14170 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Note 2: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 52. MLPE with Sample Selection Estimates of Promotion to O-4 Models (cont.) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
 prom_o4 survived_o4brd prom_o4 survived_o4brd 
Married at O-3 N/A N/A 0.143 N/A 
 N/A N/A (4.31)*** N/A 
To be Married at 
O-3 
N/A N/A 0.341 N/A 




0.218 N/A  N/A 
 (11.08)***    
African American -0.089 -0.036 -0.080 -0.034 
 (1.16) (0.70) (1.04) (0.66) 
Hispanic -0.134 -0.037 -0.137 -0.033 
 (1.37) (0.55) (1.40) (0.48) 
Other race -0.025 -0.015 -0.074 -0.009 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.72) (0.13) 
TBS Class Rank 
Percentile 
0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 (10.77)*** (13.57)*** (10.70)*** (13.54)*** 
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Table 52. MLPE with Sample Selection Estimates of Promotion to O-4 Models (cont.) 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.095 0.055 -0.097 0.054 
 (1.57) (1.31) (1.61) (1.30) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.116 -0.062 -0.098 -0.064 
 (2.13)** (1.65)* (1.79)* (1.69)* 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.013 -0.286 0.043 -0.284 
 (0.20) (6.52)*** (0.68) (6.46)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.027 0.347 0.219 0.357 
 (0.25) (3.34)*** (2.04)** (3.42)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
0.094 -0.082 0.262 -0.071 
 (0.94) (0.95) (2.64)*** (0.81) 
Commissioning 
Age 
N/A 0.046 N/A 0.044 




N/A 0.542 N/A 0.528 
 N/A (4.99)*** N/A (4.81)*** 
Not Recommended 
for promotion 
N/A -0.929 N/A -0.927 
 N/A (6.37)*** N/A (6.35)*** 
Prior Enlisted 
Service 
N/A 0.272 N/A 0.266 
 N/A (5.09)*** N/A (4.95)*** 
Ground Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.027 N/A -0.028 
 N/A (0.90) N/A (0.92) 
Combat MOS N/A -0.028 N/A -0.023 
 N/A (0.78) N/A (0.65) 
Aviation MOS N/A 0.368 N/A 0.378 
 N/A (13.46)*** N/A (13.85)*** 
Aviation Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.141 N/A -0.141 
 N/A (3.59)*** N/A (3.56)*** 
Constant 0.231 -1.116 0.172 -1.064 
 (2.13)** (6.47)*** (1.57) (6.09)*** 
Observations 14170 14170 14116 14116 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 53. MLPE with Sample Selection Estimates of Promotion to O-5 Models  
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
 prom_o5 survived_o5brd prom_o5 survived_o5brd 
Married at O-4 0.085 N/A N/A N/A 
 (2.07)** N/A N/A N/A 
Accumulated years 
in marriage until 
O-5 board  
N/A N/A 0.001 N/A 
 N/A N/A (0.27) N/A 
African American 0.032 -0.027 -0.023 -0.043 
 (0.31) (0.29) (0.22) (0.46) 
Hispanic 0.172 0.063 0.107 0.039 
 (1.11) (0.43) (0.69) (0.27) 
Other race -0.042 -0.008 -0.046 -0.025 
 (0.24) (0.05) (0.27) (0.17) 
TBS Class Rank 
Percentile 
0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 




0.679 0.688 0.661 0.670 
 (6.27)*** (6.24)*** (6.19)*** (6.14)*** 
Not Recommended 
for promotion 
-5.211 -0.832 -8.190 -0.876 
 (0.01) (2.90)*** (.) (3.07)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.025 -0.006 -0.015 0.004 
 (0.33) (0.08) (0.20) (0.06) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.108 -0.086 -0.095 -0.074 
 (1.58) (1.34) (1.43) (1.17) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.136 -0.155 -0.137 -0.153 
 (1.93)* (2.28)** (1.99)** (2.29)** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.655 -0.909 -0.686 -0.946 
 (4.33)*** (5.54)*** (4.55)*** (5.82)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.103 -0.403 -0.127 -0.423 
 (0.92) (2.79)*** (1.15) (2.97)*** 
Commissioning 
Age 
N/A 0.043 N/A 0.041 




Table 53. MLPE with Sample Selection Estimates of Promotion to O-5 Models (Cont.)  
Prior Enlisted 
Service 
N/A 0.428 N/A 0.439 
 N/A (4.06)*** N/A (4.24)*** 
Ground Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.013 N/A -0.013 
 N/A (0.37) N/A (0.38) 
Combat MOS N/A -0.033 N/A -0.036 
 N/A (0.77) N/A (0.87) 
Aviation MOS N/A -0.049 N/A -0.046 
 N/A (1.72)* N/A (1.68)* 
Aviation Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.087 N/A -0.076 
 N/A (1.87)* N/A (1.67)* 
Constant -1.345 -1.853 -1.204 -1.762 
 (16.11)*** (9.17)*** (15.78)*** (8.91)*** 
Observations 5436 5436 5563 5563 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 53. MLPE with Sample Selection Estimates of Promotion to O-5 Models (Cont.)  
 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
 prom_o5 survived_o5brd prom_o5 survived_o5brd 
Married at O-4 N/A N/A 0.072 N/A 
 N/A N/A (1.72)* N/A 
To be Married at O-
4 
N/A N/A 0.056 N/A 




0.082 N/A N/A N/A 
 (6.10)*** N/A N/A N/A 
African American 0.001 -0.053 0.030 -0.025 
 (0.01) (0.56) (0.29) (0.26) 
Hispanic 0.076 0.043 0.171 0.064 
 (0.49) (0.29) (1.11) (0.43) 
Other race -0.021 -0.035 -0.056 -0.007 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.33) (0.05) 
TBS Class Rank 
Percentile 
0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009 









0.634 0.678 0.680 0.687 
 (5.92)*** (6.22)*** (6.17)*** (6.18)*** 
Not Recommended 
for promotion 
-8.410 -0.879 -7.886 -0.830 
 (.) (3.07)*** (.) (2.85)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-NROTC 
-0.005 0.002 -0.021 -0.005 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.28) (0.07) 
Commissioning 
Source-PLC 
-0.087 -0.078 -0.103 -0.085 
 (1.30) (1.24) (1.50) (1.32) 
Commissioning 
Source-OCC 
-0.140 -0.163 -0.128 -0.153 
 (2.02)** (2.44)** (1.81)* (2.25)** 
Commissioning 
Source-MECEP 
-0.733 -0.969 -0.638 -0.905 
 (4.84)*** (5.99)*** (4.20)*** (5.51)*** 
Commissioning 
Source-ECP 
-0.151 -0.438 -0.087 -0.400 
 (1.36) (3.10)*** (0.78) (2.77)*** 
Commissioning Age N/A 0.045 N/A 0.042 
 N/A (5.45)*** N/A (4.71)*** 
Prior Enlisted 
Service 
N/A 0.439 N/A 0.428 
 N/A (4.29)*** N/A (4.03)*** 
Ground Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.006 N/A -0.015 
 N/A (0.17) N/A (0.44) 
Combat MOS N/A -0.026 N/A -0.035 
 N/A (0.62) N/A (0.82) 
Aviation MOS N/A -0.055 N/A -0.047 
 N/A (2.03)** N/A (1.67)* 
Aviation Support 
MOS 
N/A -0.081 N/A -0.082 
 N/A (1.77)* N/A (1.76)* 
Constant -1.328 -1.850 -1.348 -1.830 
 (17.52)*** (9.48)*** (12.37)*** (8.08)*** 
Observations 5563 5563 5436 5436 
Note 1: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
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